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INTRODUCTION
An announcement on June 18, 2009, by global mining company Rio
Tinto sent a powerful message to law firms that the world is changing. The
company declared that it had entered into an agreement with legal process
outsourcing (LPO) company CPA Global to perform legal work on a scale
that would reduce Rio Tinto’s annual legal expenses by an estimated twenty
percent, or tens of millions of dollars.1 This work currently was being done
by lawyers in the company’s legal department. Traditionally, if a
company’s inside lawyers did not handle legal work, the company engaged
an outside law firm to do much of it. Rio Tinto’s managing attorney, Leah
Cooper, however, explained that the company no longer wanted to pursue
that option: “For a long time,” she said, “we’ve been asking law firms to
provide us with ways to better control and predict our costs, but at best they
offered a discount or a cap in fees . . . . In the end, we decided to take the
initiative ourselves.”2
A team of CPA lawyers in India will be dedicated to working for Rio
Tinto, and Cooper has said that she wants them to function as does any
other Rio Tinto office.3 At the time of the announcement, CPA had already
completed forty projects for the company, including contract review, legal
research and analysis, merger and acquisition due diligence work, and draft
joint venture agreements, as well as gathering fifty lawyers within fortyeight hours in Washington D.C. to handle an electronic discovery request
from the Federal Trade Commission.4 The majority of the work that the
LPO will be performing is relatively routine, but Rio Tinto stresses that
most of it “is not volume-based; it’s day-to-day work that requires constant
communication.”5 Furthermore, the mining company wants CPA lawyers
to take on more sophisticated and strategic work.6
Rio Tinto’s announcement occurred in the midst of an economic
recession, but the forces that led to it were in place well before the
downturn. Corporate clients in recent years increasingly have insisted that
law firms provide legal services more efficiently. Inside counsel have the
responsibility to meet a budget just like any other corporate department.
They are asked to be increasingly productive—often to do more on a
smaller budget. This requires that they minimize their companies’ spending
on legal services and be able to predict for corporate managers what those
expenses will be. Since spending on outside law firms is the lion’s share of
most corporate legal department budgets, counsel are putting pressure on
1. Breaking New Ground, LEGAL STRATEGY REV., Summer 2009, at 13, 15. The
company estimates that using CPA Global will result in cost savings of 3:1 for work that
would have been done in house and 7:1 for work that would have been sent to outside law
firms. Id. at 14.
2. Id. at 13.
3. Id. at 14.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 15.
6. Id.

2010]

SUPPLY CHAINS AND POROUS BOUNDARIES

2139

firms to deliver better services at lower cost. Some are entering into
variations of fixed fee arrangements, under which a firm will agree to
handle a particular matter within a certain budget, with the possibility of
adjustments depending on the outcome. In this and other ways, corporate
clients are asking firms to share more of the legal risk, and to consider how
they can be more innovative and cost effective in providing representation.
Rio Tinto’s contract with CPA Global represents an initiative in which
inside counsel is attempting to manage legal costs by expanding
competition for corporate legal work beyond law firms. CPA Global will
be doing millions of dollars worth of work that law firm associates
otherwise would be doing. Rio Tinto’s standard for using CPA lawyers
poses a direct threat to firms: “If you had a junior associate sitting next to
you, would you hand the assignment to that junior associate? If the answer
is ‘yes,’ it can probably go to India.”7 At present, this work is mainly
routine, but law firms can make considerable profits by having associates
perform it. In addition, much of it traditionally has provided opportunities
for young law firm lawyers to gain experience and training. The
competitive threat to law firms does not end there, however. Rio Tinto is
not satisfied with limiting CPA Global to routine work; it wants the LPO
increasingly to assume responsibility for more complex matters. As CPA
does so, this will mean even less business for outside law firms. Rio Tinto
stresses that it will still hire law firms for their “strategic expertise.”8 As
time goes on, and LPOs gain more sophisticated expertise, however, that
may begin to encompass a smaller and smaller portion of work, which
could spell trouble for many of today’s large law firms.
To compete in this world, law firms will have to begin considering how
they might engage in the same disaggregation process as their clients. That
is, they will need to break work down into discrete units and determine who
is the most cost-efficient provider of each component. In some cases, that
provider may be outside the firm, and the firm will need to engage in
outsourcing. Law firms thus might increasingly face the same decision that
their corporate clients regularly confront: whether to produce all the goods
or services they need inside the firm or contract to obtain them from third
parties in the market.
If the legal services market so develops, that sector of the economy
would come to mimic the way that production is organized in many other
industries. Corporate outsourcing of legal work is an example of what
many organizations—including law firms—have been doing for many
years: outsourcing administrative and support services. Outside vendors
now assume responsibility for human resources, accounting, and
information technology functions for many economic enterprises. These
are all activities that assist an organization in conducting its basic line of
7. Interview by Richard Susskind with Leah Cooper, Managing Attorney, Rio Tinto
(Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1556450/legal-processoutsourcing-richard-susskind-leah-cooper.
8. Breaking New Ground, supra note 1, at 15.
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business, whether manufacturing automobiles or providing telecommunications
service. For corporations, legal services also constitute a support function
that helps a company pursue its mission.9 Rio Tinto’s business is not
providing legal services, but mining, and the law department helps it
conduct this business effectively.
For law firms, however, providing legal services is their business. In
economic terms, having a portion of that work done by people outside the
firm constitutes outsourcing parts of its production operations to third
parties. Widespread adoption of this practice by law firms therefore would
correspond to corporations’ increasing tendency to divide up the process of
producing goods and services into discrete components and contracting
with suppliers to provide them. As Walter Powell has observed, “the
growing reliance of established firms in all industries on outside parties for
nearly every stage in the research, design, and production process has
become very strong.”10
Examples from manufacturing and service industries illustrate how far
this trend has progressed. In aerospace manufacturing, companies have
begun to outsource responsibility not only for producing discrete parts of an
aircraft but for more complex and knowledge-intensive activities, such as
conceptualization and design.11 Boeing, for example, outsourced the design
of wings for 7E7 aircraft to a Japanese company and production of parts of
the fuselage to an Italian company.12 It gave “total production competence”
to those companies; they were responsible for that entire section of the
aircraft from conceptualization to production.13 This design and production
task is technologically complex and requires substantial knowledge on the
part of the outside companies. Outsourcing such functions, however, has
significantly reduced costs in this industry.14 Companies have enjoyed
these savings despite significant costs associated with moving technology
and production capacity to a new location. The aerospace industry was
long regarded as a highly specialized industry that produced goods that had
to be assembled in a specific way in a single location. As more producers
realize that they can segment the production process, they have increasingly
9. See Mari Sako, Global Strategies in the Legal Services Marketplace: Institutional
Impacts on Value Chain Dynamics 3 (July 2009) (unpublished article, on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
10. Walter W. Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging
Patterns in Western Enterprise, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33, 65 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001)
[hereinafter THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM].
11. David Pritchard & Alan MacPherson, Outsourcing US Commercial Aircraft
Technology and Innovation: Implications for the Industry’s Long Term Design and Build
Capability 1, 1–3 (Can.-U.S. Trade Ctr., Occasional Paper No. 29, 2004).
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
14. G. R. Hall & R. E. Johnson, Transfers of United States Aerospace Technology to
Japan, in THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 305, 354 (Raymond Vernon
ed., 1970); Scott E. Masten, The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace
Industry, 27 J.L. & ECON. 403, 411–13 (1984).
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reaped the substantial cost savings that can come from outsourcing
production to third parties that make up a company’s supply chain.
Outsourcing also has progressed significantly in healthcare services in
recent years—an industry that is similar to legal services in its demand for
advanced training and complex judgment, and in the traditional belief that
providing service in person is essential.15 Advances in information and
communications technology have spurred this development. Medical
services such as interpreting CAT scans and MRIs, writing radiology
reports, transcribing medical notes, and remote diagnosis are now common,
with much of the work performed overseas.16 For instance, when medical
providers are stretched thin, especially during the nighttime hours in the
United States, qualified physicians in India are able to review their
diagnoses and provide additional assurance that they are accurate. In areas
where medical services cannot be provided on a consistent basis, physicians
in other states and countries can step in remotely and provide immediate
medical advice. Furthermore, some rural hospitals now rely on remote
electronic Intensive Care Unit (ICU) providers, who “simultaneously
monitor ICU patients in several hospitals from a central location.”17 The
providers use video surveillance and real-time data feeds to consult with
and advise nurses at the bedside.18
The American Telemedicine Association (ATA) reports that, while
radiology makes the greatest use of remote services, other specialties
including dermatology, ophthalmology, mental health, cardiology, and
pathology do as well.19 The ATA estimates that over fifty subspecialties
have used telemedicine, which it defines as “the use of medical information
exchanged from one site to another via electronic communications.”20 A
hospital or group of physicians thus is increasingly likely to deliver medical
services by contracting with a network of specialized providers who may be
located anywhere in the world.
As a result, a growing number of companies are producing goods and
services by relying on supply chains that extend beyond the formal
boundaries of the organization. This article examines the prospect that law
firms will move in this direction and the implications for the organization of
15. See William K. Foxx, Michele D. Bunn & Valarie McCay, Outsourcing Services in
the Healthcare Sector, 9 J. MED. MARKETING 41, 41–43 (2009). See generally Sangiv N.
Singh & Robert M. Wachter, Perspectives on Medical Outsourcing and Telemedicine—
Rough Edges in a Flat World?, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1622 (2008); Robert M. Wachter, The
“Dis-location” of U.S. Medicine—The Implications of Medical Outsourcing, 354 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 661 (2006); Gretchen Henkel, X-Ray Has Left the Building, HOSPITALIST, Dec. 2006,
http://www.the-hospitalist.org/details/article/196171/XRay_Has_Left_the_Building.html.
16. See Amar Gupta et al., Outsourcing in the Healthcare Industry: Information
Technology, Intellectual Property, and Allied Aspects, INFO. RESOURCES MGMT. J., Jan.–
Mar. 2008, at 1, 1–3.
17. Henkel, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Telemedicine Defined—American Telemedicine Association, http://www.american
telemed.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3333 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
20. Id.
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legal services and legal careers if they did. It does so, first, by analyzing
scholarship on what has been called the “make or buy” decision, and then
by examining research on the various ways that extending production
beyond a firm’s boundaries can affect an organization and its employees.
Much of our analysis necessarily will be tentative. There has been no
sustained theoretical or empirical work on the disaggregation of law firm
services or the use of outsourcing to help provide them. We suggest that
scholarship on other business organizations may provide at least a
preliminary framework for thinking about these issues, but that framework
inevitably will need to be revised to take account of the distinctive features
of law firms and legal services. As a result, this article likely will raise at
least as many questions as it answers. We hope, however, that they are
questions that lead to a deeper understanding of the forces shaping law firm
practice at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
I. DISAGGREGATION AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A. The Make or Buy Decision
Ronald Coase was among the first to explore the logic of market
organizations. In The Nature of the Firm, Coase asks why the market is
organized into large firms rather than as individual entrepreneurs working
as independent contractors.21 The prevailing theory in Coase’s time was
that the market is always the most efficient method of production and that
outsourcing theoretically will always be the most efficient option. Coase,
however, suggested that firms exist because individuals cannot effectively
manage production by themselves. He noted that there are substantial costs
associated with using the market, which are associated with contracting,
controlling risk, and delivering a product.22 For many of the goods that
Coase studied, the cost of labor and delivery connected with the end
product was greater than the cost of the capital inputs that went into
production.23 As a result, individual entrepreneurs arranged themselves
into larger collectives in order to deal more efficiently with, and spread the
costs of, the production process.24
This analysis led Coase to establish guidelines for firms in assessing
whether to make a product or provide a service within the firm or to obtain
it from an outside supplier. These guidelines suggest that a firm will
choose to produce more goods internally when the costs of doing so are not
outweighed by the potential benefits of sending production outside the
firm.25 In order to calculate the costs and benefits of each alternative,
Coase developed three criteria for firms to analyze: the costs of organizing
See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
Id. at 388.
See id. at 389.
Id.; see also George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 968 (2007).
25. Coase, supra note 21, at 394.
21.
22.
23.
24.

2010]

SUPPLY CHAINS AND POROUS BOUNDARIES

2143

production, the likelihood of mistakes, and the marginal benefit of
increasing production.26 Firms should be structured so as to attain an
optimal balance between production inside and outside of the firm. The
growth of those that fail to strike this balance will be constrained. Firms
thus represent a delicate balance of costs and benefits, which are influenced
by the size of the firm and the nature of its production.27 Coase focuses
much of his attention on the process by which a firm can determine the
optimal point between internal production and outsourcing of goods and
services.
Coase’s theories, known collectively as relating to the “make or buy”
decision, have become pervasive in modern economic and business
analysis.28 Scholars since Coase have identified various other industries in
which the concept of the make or buy decision is applicable and have built
upon the framework of the original theory.29
In expanding upon and refining Coase’s work, Oliver Williamson arrived
at the conclusion that nearly all decisions in the firm are, or ought to be,
determined by the relative costs of internally producing or transacting for
the production of goods.30 He theorized that this calculation should dictate
whether firms integrate their production completely internally—that is, are
vertically integrated—or send all or part of their production outside the
firm—in other words, are vertically disintegrated. To use Williamson’s
terms, firms can rely either on hierarchies or markets to organize
production.31
Key considerations in the make or buy decision include the extent to
which a firm can decompose its production process, determine which assets
are firm specific, and address risks associated with uncertainty. First, firms
must be able to separate their activities into relatively discrete components
or stages whose production can be assigned to the most cost-efficient
providers. In manufacturing, such decomposition is of course common,
since the production process involves the use of distinct items that can be
separately created and then assembled in sequences that culminate in a
finished product. In some cases, the components are designed so that there
is virtually no need for coordination among them. One portion of an
26. Id. at 396–97.
27. See id. at 389.
28. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D.
Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social
Sciences (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 115, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924192.
29. See generally Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific
Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168 (1987); Saul
Klein, A Transaction Cost Explanation of Vertical Control in International Markets, 17 J.
ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 253 (1989).
30. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost
Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 554 (1981).
31. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975).
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automobile can be assembled, for instance, and then fitted seamlessly into
another portion because the two have been designed to fit together. Even if
this process occurs within a single organization, theoretically “[e]ach
module, at the extreme, could become the sole business of a specialist firm,
which would have complete design authority over the specific module on
which it focuses.”32 In other instances, there may be more need for
supervision to ensure that the completed product of one phase of production
is smoothly handed off in useable form to those responsible for the next
phase.
In the service sector, decomposition has relied on analysis of work flow,
or the steps involved in providing a service to an end user. These steps are
subdivided into constituent sets of tasks and activities, with an estimate of
the time and resources required for each. Each step serves as the equivalent
of a module that can be performed by one set of actors and handed off to
others involved in succeeding steps. Workflow systems may be nested
within larger projects to handle portions of work that can be standardized.33
A second step in the make or buy decision is to identify which resources
are especially valuable to a firm’s core activities and crucial to its
distinctive expertise.34 Assets that fall into this category are said to be high
in “specificity.”35 Core functions traditionally have been defined as those
value-creating activities that are crucial to an organization’s competitive
advantage.36 “The nature of the core activity or function differs from one
organization to another: for an automobile manufacturing plant, the core
activity might be assembling a car; for a school, it is educating students;
and for a bank, it might be handling financial transactions.”37 Because of
the risks associated with external production, products high in asset
specificity generally are produced internally.38 By contrast, products that
are low in asset specificity are more likely to be acquired from parties in the
market.39
Williamson identifies four types of asset specificity: site specificity,
physical asset specificity, dedicated asset specificity, and human asset
32. Stefano Brusoni, The Limits to Specialization: Problem Solving and Coordination in
“Modular Networks,” 26 ORG. STUD. 1885, 1886 (2005).
33. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 137 (2008).
34. See id. at 169.
35. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
36. See, e.g., Ulli Arnold, New Dimensions of Outsourcing: A Combination of
Transaction Cost Economics and the Core Competencies Concept, 6 EUR. J. OF PURCHASING
& SUPPLY MGMT. 23, 26 (2000); Charles B. Stabell & Oystein D. Fjeldstad, Configuring
Value for Competitive Advantage: On Chains, Shops, and Networks, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 413, 413 (1998). On the concept of competitive advantage, see generally MICHAEL E.
PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1985).
37. Torstein Nesheim, Karen M. Olsen & Arne L. Kalleberg, Externalizing the Core:
Firms’ Use of Employment Intermediaries in the Information and Communication
Technology Industries, 46 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 247, 249 (2007).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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specificity.40 Most relevant to our discussion are physical asset specificity,
dedicated asset specificity, and human asset specificity.41 Physical asset
specificity exists when a party makes an investment in particular
infrastructure that would have a lower value in other transactions.42 Firms
that invest in information technology infrastructure, for example, are
making investments in physically specific assets. Dedicated assets are
investments made in anticipation of a specific contract. Human asset
specificity is perhaps the most important for firms in the service industry.43
Such assets represent investments in a labor pool whose skills are used in
the firm’s production process.
Paul Joskow has focused on the influence of asset specificity on the make
or buy decision in his empirical work on transaction cost theory. His
analysis of investments in infrastructure for the mining, production, and use
of coal has led him to conclude that asset specificity is one of the most
significant factors in explaining the extent to which firms internalize or
externalize production.44 Specifically, Joskow has found that when an asset
is of high value to the firm, the firm is likely to keep production of it inside
or engage in long-term contracting to reduce risks associated with acquiring
the asset from an outside producer.45
Joskow’s findings are drawn from studies of coal power plants, coal
miners, and the contractual relationships that shaped the coal industry
during the 1980s. His research examined how power plants that burn coal
to produce energy can become more efficient by outsourcing coal mining in
some situations, using spot contracts for coal in others, and mining the coal
themselves in still other instances.46 Joskow found that within the coal
industry, power plants engaged in different forms of contracting and
production in order to secure the coal that they needed for their production
process. Power plants were likely either to engage in long-term contracting
to obtain coal or to locate their power plants at the mouth of coal mines and
mine the coal themselves when (1) the specific type of coal was extremely
important to the plant and (2) unique assets had to be deployed in order to
secure production because of either the rare nature of the coal or the
intensive nature of extracting it from the ground.47 The relatively specific
nature of the assets required to obtain rare forms of coal, in other words,
40. Joskow, supra note 29, at 170 & n.14.
41. Site specificity is a form of asset specificity that reflects location-specific
investments, which cannot be transferred after the investments are made. They are
traditionally assessed when applying transaction cost economics to industries involving
heavy manufacturing. Id. at 170–71.
42. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Support
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 523 (1983).
43. Id. at 526–28.
44. See Joskow, supra note 29, at 169.
45. Id. at 180; Paul L. Joskow, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: The Case of
Coal, 31 J.L. & ECON. 47, 53 (1988).
46. Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships:
Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 101 (1988).
47. See Joskow, supra note 45, at 53.
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dictated a more secure method of production.48 When coal was relatively
plentiful and less difficult to extract, however, power plants were more
likely to secure the supplies necessary for production by engaging in shortterm or spot contracting.49
Aside from his empirical work on transaction cost economics, Joskow
has refined the theoretical framework that Williamson put forward. While
Williamson was the first to define the four types of asset specificity, Joskow
has provided practical definitions for each type. He also has emphasized
that asset specificity is not binary but can vary incrementally. By locating
assets on a spectrum between low and high specificity, firms can outsource
using long-term, near-term, and spot contracting to increase the benefits
they can obtain from outsourcing.50 While these options may not allow
firms to realize the full benefits of pure disaggregation, they do allow them
to mitigate more precisely the risk of outsourcing, especially with respect to
activities they have identified as being of high value.
Akbar Zaheer and his colleagues have focused on two other dimensions
of the types of asset specificity that Williamson defined.51 The first is the
knowledge and skill that individuals within the firm possess and how
specific those skills are to the firm’s activities.52 If the human-capital assets
the firm needs to produce a good are highly specific to the process, a firm
may be more likely to continue producing that good within the firm.53 The
second dimension is the nature of the procedures that firms must deploy,
which has a substantial impact on a firm’s decision to vertically
disaggregate.54 When a firm has very specific procedures that it must
develop to produce certain goods, it becomes difficult for the firm to
contract with third parties to obtain those goods in the market at comparable
cost and quality.55
A third consideration in the make or buy decision is the risks arising from
uncertainty associated with production inside or outside of the firm. These
risks include the possibility of opportunism and the existence of bounded
rationality.56 Opportunism occurs when parties act in their own self-interest
at the expense of others. Production outside the firm exposes it to the risk
that the suppliers with which it contracts will exploit the firm’s dependence
on them to extract benefits beyond those specified in the original
agreements. While not everyone acts opportunistically, at least some
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Joskow, supra note 46, at 101.
51. Akbar Zaheer & N. Venkatraman, Determinants of Electronic Integration in the
Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test, 40 MGMT. SCI. 549, 553 (1994).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 550, 561.
54. See id.
55. Alternatively, a knowledge-based theory of the firm would suggest that the reason
for integration in this situation is less the cost or difficulty of using the market than the
particular benefits that will accrue from producing the goods internally.
56. See generally Williamson, supra note 30, at 552–60.
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people will, and it is impossible to assess who will do so and when.57
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that people lack the ability to process
all the information available in the market.58 As a consequence, no one is
able to assess every possible outcome that could result from a decision. In
deciding whether to organize production internally or externally, firms must
assign probabilities to the potential costs and benefits of each alternative.59
The confidence with which it can do so—or, put differently, different levels
of uncertainty associated with internal and external production—may lead it
to select one approach over the other.
Analyzing these considerations can help firms make rational decisions
about whether to make something internally or outsource production by
contracting with a supplier for goods or services.60 When uncertainty and
asset specificity are low, for instance, traditional theory says that firms
generally should outsource production.61 Sourcing production of various
inputs to the least-cost provider can enable a firm to lower production costs
and increase marginal profits on each good or service that it sells.62 In
addition, a firm can be more flexible in response to changing economic
conditions, adjusting the scale of its production and the amount of inputs
that it must use depending on market demand.63 A firm converts what
would have been a fixed cost into a variable cost, which the firm can choose
to pay based on the amount of productive capacity it needs at any given
time.64 Finally, a firm may free up its internal resources for more complex
work, thereby expanding capacity for higher-value activities.65
When asset specificity is high, there is a risk that outside suppliers may
act opportunistically because the asset is not sufficiently fungible that it can
be acquired from a large number of sources in the market.66 This raises the
potential cost of outsourcing, the risk of which cannot be completely
57. Id. at 554.
58. Id. at 553.
59. See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 29, at 171.
60. Gordon Walker & David Weber, A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy
Decisions, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 373, 376 (1984). An additional consideration that sometimes
is relevant is frequency of production. See Williamson, supra note 35, at 239. When a firm
produces something infrequently, it would not make economic sense for it to incur the cost
of maintaining a permanent in-house operation to produce it. The firm thus is more likely to
acquire the inputs to make it from other parties as needed. See id. at 241; see also Lisa M.
Ellram et al., Offshore Outsourcing of Professional Services: A Transaction Cost Economics
Perspective, 26 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 148, 150 (2008). Scholarship in transaction cost
economics generally devotes little attention to the concept of frequency, since it is the easiest
aspect for firms to analyze. While the level of production activity can be plotted on a
continuum, there often is a readily distinguishable line that identifies when production is
frequent enough to justify internal production.
61. Ellram, supra note 60, at 150.
62. See id. at 148–50.
63. See id.; Saul Klein, A Transaction Cost Analysis Model of Channel Integration in
International Markets, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 196, 200, 205 (1990).
64. Klein, supra note 63, at 200, 205.
65. Kevin Chern, Legal Process Outsourcing Makes Sense for Busy Consumer
Bankruptcy Attorneys, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44–45, 64 (2009).
66. Id.
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eliminated by contractual provisions.67 Firms therefore may choose to
produce internally or to engage in long-term contracting with an external
producer in order to mitigate its risk. In addition, a knowledge-based
theory of the firm suggests that asset specificity may make internal
production especially efficient because it enables the use of firm-specific
language and routines.68
B. Legal Services
The economic theory of the firm suggests that the ability of law firms to
decompose their services, determine which assets are firm specific, and
address the risks associated with uncertainty will shape the future of
outsourcing in this part of the legal services market.
1. Decomposition
Legal services traditionally have been regarded as relatively “bundled,”
in the sense that they consist of tightly linked elements that cannot be easily
separated. The underlying premise of this assumption is that someone with
a distinct sense of legal judgment is necessary to understand how the
various elements of a matter are linked together. The corollary is that
persons without this perspective are likely to miss legally significant
features of information.
Law firms, however, have been decomposing their work within the firm
for quite some time. They delegate responsibility for discrete aspects of a
case or a transaction to a variety of people, both lawyers and nonlawyers, in
what we might think of as a supply chain. A major piece of litigation, for
instance, involves a complex division of labor that includes preparation of
and response to discovery requests; review of documents for
responsiveness, relevance, significance, and privilege; preparation of
deposition questions and digests of deposition testimony; briefings with
experts; preparation of motions and pleadings; argument at trial; and
numerous other tasks. Large transactions include people working on
various aspects of due diligence, review of regulatory compliance,
preparation of a multitude of interconnected documents, negotiation, and
many other activities. This work may be divided among paralegals, staff
attorneys, junior associates, senior associates, income partners, and equity
partners.
67. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 1–14, 73–93
(1995). Oliver Hart is associated with what has become known as the “property rights
theory of the firm,” which posits that firms represent a way to allocate control over assets,
which serves to establish background entitlements for the purpose of negotiating inevitably
incomplete contracts. He suggests that this theory shares with transaction cost analysis a
concern with contractual incompleteness but that a property rights approach places more
emphasis on “the idea that power is important [and] that institutional agents are designed to
allocate power among agents.” Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
68. See Kirk Monteverde, Technical Dialog as an Incentive for Vertical Integration in
the Semiconductor Industry, 41 MGMT. SCI. 1624, 1629 (1995).
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Ideally, this division of labor reflects an effort to direct work to the least
costly person who can perform it and to maximize use of the distinct set of
skills that each person can deploy. Furthermore, the allocation of
responsibility has shifted over time, as junior partners now do what senior
partners used to, senior associates do work formerly done by junior
partners, junior associates complete the tasks that used to be done by senior
associates, paralegals take on responsibilities formerly borne by junior
associates, and technology substitutes for some tasks paralegals used to do.
Law firms also increasingly have begun to use contract lawyers as part of
these teams.69 They have looked, in other words, to workers outside the
firm so that they can use even lower-cost personnel to perform services,
both to reduce costs to clients and to avoid high fixed overhead in the face
of fluctuating demand.70
In addition, as the Financial Times observes, “Across the range of
initiatives implemented by law firms, there are signs of increased
standardisation of the legal process. In particular, law firms are
harnessing technology to a greater degree to streamline services or offer
analysis that would previously have been impossible.”71

Linklaters’s Blue Flag service, for instance, provides information for
financial institutions on regulatory provisions around the globe. As the
website for this service states, “[i]nformation is structured according to the
types of financial institution, how you are regulated, where you do business,
and the nature of your business. There is no more wading through statutes
and rules and regulations to find what’s relevant or who to contact.”72
Thus, for instance, an offshore broker may be interested in selling shares in
an offshore company to investors in Hong Kong. Issues that might arise
could include whether the broker needs to be licensed in Hong Kong to
engage in this transaction, whether it will be treated as a public offering or
can be accomplished through a private placement, and what the answer
69. “In recent years, we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of ‘contract
lawyers’ used in firms (i.e., lawyers hired for a particular project or set of projects without
expectation of permanent employment) and that trend seems certain to continue.”
HILDEBRANDT & CITI PRIVATE BANK, CLIENT ADVISORY: JANUARY 2009, at 15–16 (2009);
see also Olivia Clarke, Lawyers Fill Temporary Need for Firms, Companies, CHI. LAW.,
Aug. 2007, at 52; Melanie Healy, Rise of the Contract Fillers, LAWYER, Feb. 20, 2006,
http://www.thelawyer.com/rise-of-the-contract-fillers/118935.article.
70. Firms also have sought to avoid the risk of incurring excessive fixed costs when
demand is irregular by handling large projects through syndication rather than internal
growth. See generally Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab & Robert G. Hansen,
Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2001).
71. Bob Sherwood, Heads Together, in FINANCIAL TIMES SPECIAL REPORT: FT
INNOVATIVE LAWYERS (2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57191ae4-bc49-11de-942600144feab49a,dwp_uuid=ec1082a4-08a3-11de-b8b0-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1;
see, e.g., Nick Holmes, Online Legal Services—What the Big Firms Are Doing, INTERNET
NEWSL.
FOR
LAW.
(Delia
Venables,
Lewes,
U.K.),
Jan./Feb.
2006,
http://www.venables.co.uk/n0601bigfirms.htm.
72. Linklaters Blue Flag, Online Legal Services from Linklaters:
Regulatory,
http://www.linklaters.com/OnlineServices/Pages/Regulatory.aspx (last visited Feb. 27,
2010).
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might be to these questions if the broker wants to sell shares in other
countries.
Linklaters also uses the DealBuilder automated document assembly
program for its Term Sheet Generator service, which helps bankers produce
term sheets by providing interactive guidance on structuring financial
transactions tailored to the needs and wishes of the parties. This service
“enables bankers to create term sheets automatically at their desktops—with
thousands of possible combinations—by completing a simple
questionnaire.”73 Wilson Sonsini also has an online venture financing term
sheet that is based upon users’ responses to a questionnaire.74 Eversheds’s
HR Contract Builder provides similar assistance to human resource
professionals by automating the process of drafting employment
documents.75 Allen & Overy uses HotDocs to produce tailored legal
documents assembled from thousands of clause combinations, working
through a set of interview questions.76 On the Mexican Wave service
project, Lovells took responsibility for complex high-end work, while
outsourcing more routine activities to a “group of smaller law firms that
were supported by various online tools.”77 These and other initiatives
suggest that law firms are able to decompose certain portions of the legal
advice process and produce them at relatively low cost.
The activities of law firms themselves thus suggest that it is possible to
decompose legal services to a certain extent. The emergence of LPOs in
recent years provides further evidence that such decomposition is feasible.
Consider, for instance, the range of different activities in which CPA Global
engages.78 It includes preparing summonses and complaints, interrogatories
and requests for production of documents, motions, witness kits, timelines
of events and exhibits, deposition summaries in various formats,
memoranda of law, legal briefs, letters to third parties presenting a legal
position, multijurisdictional surveys of laws, and annotated summaries of
cases.79 Its document review and management services include analysis
and identification of documents for due diligence purposes, materiality in
litigation, and privilege in response to discovery requests.80 Contract
73. Linklaters, Term Sheet Generator, http://www.linklaters.com/OnlineServices/Pages/
TermSheet.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
74. See Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Term Sheet Generator,
http://www.wsgr.com/wsgr/Display.aspx?SectionName=practice/termsheet.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2010).
75. Eversheds, HR Contract Builder Demonstration, http://www.eversheds.com/
hrcontractdemo (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
76. Holmes, supra note 71; see Allen & Overy, Online Services: NewChange
Documents,
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/OnlineServices/OnlineService.aspx?
contentTypeID=8&itemID=21926&prefLangID=410 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
77. SUSSKIND, supra note 33, at 46.
78. See CPA Global, Legal Process Outsourcing (LPO), http://www.cpaglobal.com/
legal_process_outsourcing (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
79. CPA Global, Preparation of Litigation Documents, http://www.cpaglobal.com/
legal_process_outsourcing/litigation_documents (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
80. CPA Global, Document Review, http://www.cpaglobal.com/legal_process_
outsourcing/document_review (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
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management includes drafting, revising, summarizing, and analyzing
contracts.81
Pangea3, another major LPO, performs a similar range of tasks, which
includes merger and acquisition due diligence reports on companies’
potential or existing liabilities; drafting contracts such as nondisclosure
agreements, vendor contracts, supply agreements, software license
agreements, telecommunications service agreements, office leases, and
internet, advertising, and media agreements; and litigation document
organization and review.82 These readily divisible tasks are well suited for
realizing the costs and benefits traditionally associated with transaction cost
economics theory. They tend to be low in asset specificity in that they are
generic functions that can be performed by a variety of law firms and other
legal service providers and require only minimal firm-specific knowledge.
Nonetheless, decomposition is not a mechanical exercise. Identifying
discrete components and the ways in which they relate to one another
requires first that someone define the desired outputs or objectives of the
activity in question. “Problems can be framed in different ways, thus
generating different patterns of decomposition.
Conceptual design
activities are aimed chiefly at framing the problem in a specific way and, in
so doing, identifying the most relevant interdependencies, to isolate them
and explore alternative decomposition patterns.”83
Decomposition
therefore requires both analysis—in-depth knowledge of specific process
steps and operations—and synthesis—a higher-level understanding of the
process as a whole.
This is true even in manufacturing, which might seem an activity in
which decomposition is relatively straightforward. Stefano Brusoni, for
instance, describes the ways in which a project to design and engineer a
chemical plant requires choices that define a particular sequence of
chemical and physical transformations in order to produce certain chemical
compounds.84 In the services sector, a company designing a system to
respond to customer telephone inquiries will construct several different
work-flow paths based on judgments about the type of problem the
customer is having, its source, and the party or activity most likely to be
able to address it.
Organizations also must build in the flexibility to deal with
contingencies, by identifying specific steps that must be followed upon the
occurrence of particular events or delegating authority to individuals to
determine appropriate courses of action. In some cases, information gained
in carrying out various steps may lead to a revised definition of a problem

81. CPA Global, Contract Management, http://www.cpaglobal.com/legal_process_
outsourcing/contract_management (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
82. See Pangea3, Legal Outsourcing Services, http://www.pangea3.com/legaloutsourcing-services.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
83. Brusoni, supra note 32, at 1894.
84. Id. at 1889–901.
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or a set of objectives, which may in turn require a different decomposition
of tasks and activities.
Decomposition in manufacturing and service companies thus must
include the capability to redefine outputs or objectives on the basis of
information gained in the production process. On average, however, such
companies may need to engage in this redefinition less often than providers
of legal services. In manufacturing, for instance, the objective is to create a
certain product. That objective will remain stable, even as unexpected
developments in production may require revising the means by which it is
accomplished. More ambitiously, a company may change and improve the
features of a product on the basis of knowledge gained in the production
process. Toyota, for instance, pioneered the organization of production as a
learning system that is designed continuously to provide information that
can be used in future product design.85 Changes in product design may
then require decomposing production activity in new ways. Nonetheless,
the objective of the process is concrete and relatively stable: to produce an
automobile.
Similarly, the objective of a service company is to provide a relatively
specific service to customers. A company involved in physical therapy, for
instance, aims to help patients’ injuries heal and to provide guidance on
how to prevent future injuries. As new information from medical research
becomes available, the company may decompose the therapeutic process in
different ways. Nonetheless, despite the wide range of purposes for which
people may use the Internet and the emergence of new ways to do so, an
Internet service provider has the consistent goal of providing rapid and
convenient access to the Web.
Things admittedly become more
complicated for other service providers whose customers may have more
idiosyncratic objectives. Financial planners, for instance, must take into
account a variety of client objectives in tailoring their services. Perhaps
most of these can be evaluated according to the common metric of financial
welfare, but not necessarily all of them.
This suggests that, rather than constituting a distinct category, legal
services are at one end of a continuum of service providers. Clients come
to lawyers with needs or problems that have a legal dimension. Good
lawyers recognize, however, that legal questions are only part of a larger,
more complex situation that the lawyer must appreciate in order to serve the
client well. There is no established menu of outcomes with standard
production processes that can be used to govern the provision of service.
Instead, the lawyer is actively involved in defining the situation that the
client faces and, along with the client, determining the objectives of the
representation. This in turn leads to a distinctive decomposition of the
85. See generally JEFFREY K. LIKER, THE TOYOTA WAY: 14 MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
WORLD’S GREATEST MANUFACTURER 85–168, 221–66 (2004). This system,
however, apparently failed to prevent recent dangerous defects in Toyota accelerators. See
Micheline Maynard, An Apology, and Sympathy, from Toyota's Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2010, at B1.
FROM THE
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“production process” into specific activities that are connected in particular
ways. “Inputs,” in other words, are not preexisting components that the
lawyer selects, but are dependent on the definition of “outputs”—which are
defined in different ways for different matters.
This fluidity of objectives and inputs continues throughout a
representation as new information comes to light or client preferences
evolve. Testimony at a deposition, for instance, may prompt a new line of
argument or a new theory of a case that causes a subtle revision of
objectives. This revision then may prompt redesign of the document review
and legal research components of the production process. Paralegals may
enter new search terms to identify material relevant to the line of inquiry
that deposition testimony opened up, while junior lawyers may need to
conduct research on an area of the law that previously was not regarded as
relevant until the testimony. The original decomposition of activities did
not include these particular tasks. It did, however, establish document
review and legal research as discrete components of the representation, thus
creating a flexible production process that was capable of responding to
new information as the representation proceeded.
Legal services thus may not be radically different from all other services,
but providing them is an activity in which continuing flexibility in defining
“outputs” is an especially significant dimension of the production process.
In decomposing legal services into discrete components, lawyers therefore
will need to ensure that there is ongoing communication and coordination
between strategists and persons performing more discrete tasks. Strategists
will need to establish a division of labor or problem-solving architecture
that is capable of changing inputs to correspond to redefinitions of the
service that is being provided. At the same time, those persons responsible
for narrower tasks, such as document review or deposition summaries, will
need to know enough about the broader picture to recognize information
that may prompt a redefinition of the objectives of the representation. Law
firms, legal departments, and other lawyers therefore must be aware of the
distinct challenges that decomposition can raise in the provision of legal
services.
2. Asset Specificity
Assuming that some decomposition of services is feasible, law firms
must then focus on asset specificity to determine which tasks are most
suitable for completion by persons inside and outside the firm. That is,
which resources are integral to the firm’s performance of its core functions
and which are not? In general terms, the basic function of law firms is to
provide legal services, with specific firms defining their core functions in
different ways depending upon the types of practices on which they focus.
Law firms confront a threshold challenge, however: it is not entirely clear
exactly what constitutes legal services. The organized bar has been
notoriously unsuccessful in defining the practice of law in order to exclude
nonlawyers from engaging in what lawyers traditionally have done. Other
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occupations increasingly are furnishing services that formerly were
provided only by lawyers, such as tax advice, estate planning, organizing
responses to requests for production of documents, litigation case
assessment, and legal compliance monitoring.86 Legal process outsourcing
companies are becoming involved in an expanding range of activities,
which include legal research, contract analysis, preparation of questions for
depositions and trial, and creation of legal documents.
The San Diego County Bar Association, for instance, has held that a firm
in India was not practicing law in California when it took responsibility for
conducting legal research, developing case strategy, preparing deposition
outlines, and drafting correspondence, pleadings, and motions in an
intellectual property dispute in San Diego Superior Court.87 The Bar
Association noted that “[w]hen the client asked how the attorneys
developed the theory on which summary judgment was granted, and had
done the work so inexpensively, the attorney told him that virtually all of
the work was done by India-based Legalworks.”88 As long as the twolawyer California law firm that engaged Legalworks retained control over
the case and reviewed the draft work performed by the contractor, the
Indian company was deemed to be assisting a California lawyer in
practicing law in the state, not engaging in the practice of law itself.
The difficulty in defining law firm core functions raises a fundamental
question: Why would a client engage a law firm rather than contract
directly with LPOs or other specialized suppliers to obtain the services it
needs? What do law firms offer that a client cannot obtain from a collection
of providers who furnish particular types of services?
Rio Tinto, for instance, says that it will continue to turn to law firms for
“strategic expertise.”89 Law firms thus may define their core service as
providing clients with a broad perspective, rather than performing discrete
tasks. Increasingly, corporate clients in particular are looking to lawyers
not simply for information about the law, but for practical judgment that
takes into account a wide variety of business, reputational, and political
considerations.
Parties other than law firms, however, can furnish this service. For
example, one reason for Rio Tinto’s arrangement with CPA Global is that it
frees up inside counsel to take on more strategic work. Lawyers inside the
company, in fact, may be in a better position to do this work than law firms
are, since Rio Tinto’s lawyers know the company better and, at least
theoretically, have interests more aligned with a client that is their
employer. Furthermore, lawyers have no monopoly on the ability to
provide such advice. Companies may call upon bankers, management
86. See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (2010);
Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006).
87. San Diego County Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 2007-1 (2007), http://www.sdcba.org/
index.cfm?Pg=ethicsopinion07-1.
88. Id.
89. Breaking New Ground, supra note 1, at 15.
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consultants, large accounting firms, or communications companies to help
analyze and devise strategies for dealing with complex situations.
Law firms will need to articulate reasons why clients should turn to them
rather than other professionals for such assistance. This will require them
to think more deeply about what constitutes judgment and how it can be
nurtured. Will they be able to inculcate judgment in their lawyers in an age
of increasing specialization? To what extent will law firm lawyers have
opportunities to cultivate a wide-ranging sense of judgment when many of
them work on specific projects that may give them only a narrow
perspective on the client? An individual firm will not only need to consider
these questions, but also identify how its answers distinguish the firm from
its competitors.
Even if a firm is able to develop a core function that consists of providing
wise judgment, this is an activity that is unlikely to support law firms of the
size that many have become. How might firms of 1000 or more define their
core activity? One claim might be that they are able to provide efficiencies
of scale and scope that make it more profitable to turn to them rather than to
a group of separate suppliers.
Firms may not be currently organized, however, to achieve this
advantage. Specifically, what incentive do firms have to be efficient when
their pricing model is based on hourly billing? Increasing efficiency in
providing a service means either doing a given amount of work in less time,
or more work in a given period of time. In the first scenario, however, the
time that is saved must be billed to some other project in order to avoid a
decline in revenue. Likewise, in the second scenario the time that would
have been allocated to performing the additional work must now be filled
with other projects or the firm’s revenue will drop. Under an hourly billing
system, in other words, efficiency does not necessarily pay off for the firm.
One important predicate for a large firm credibly to maintain that its size
enables it to provide services efficiently thus seems to be that it uses a
pricing model based on fixed fees, a specific budget, or some variant of this
approach. This in turn will lead a firm to place more of a premium on
building organizational capital—routines, procedures, and ways of doing
things that enhance the ability of firm members to provide service
efficiently. To the extent that firms move toward this model, they may be
better able to offer a distinctive reason for clients to use their services.
Alternatively, large law firms may argue that they are well-suited to serve
as project managers for matters on which clients use a variety of specialized
suppliers. This function could be of growing importance if clients continue
to have a demand for large, complex projects.90 We will defer detailed
discussion of their ability to play this role until later in this article.91
Suffice it to say at this point that most lawyers are not trained in the skills
necessary to serve as project managers, nor do law firms currently have as
90. See Thomas et al., supra note 70, at 138–42.
91. See infra Part II.A.2.
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much experience as accounting, consulting, or engineering firms in
coordinating projects that involve a large number of separate parties.
Successfully defining project management as a core law firm function,
therefore, will require firms to develop more expertise in tasks to which
they traditionally have not systematically devoted attention.
As a result, a given law firm may be able to engage in an analysis of asset
specificity by determining what core activities distinguish it from other
firms. This process will provide some guidance on which functions to
perform within the firm and which to outsource to independent suppliers.
In the long term, however, the firm will need to provide a persuasive
explanation of how the services it offers are distinctive compared to those
available from a wide range of organizations beyond other law firms.
3. Risks
Even if firms are able to decompose their work to a significant extent and
determine which portions should be done inside and outside the firm, they
must deal with the risks that outsourcing can pose. A firm that outsources
some functions is surrendering some degree of oversight and creating a
measure of dependence on a contractual party. This practice creates the risk
of both lapses in quality and supplier opportunism, since “[t]he outsourcing
vendor controls the activity, while the outsourcing firm ‘owns’ the result.”92
Concern about poor performance by outside suppliers may be especially
acute for law firms because of their belief that reputation is an important
consideration for clients in selecting firms in a highly competitive market.
Sociologist Joel Podolny defines reputation as “an expectation of some
behavior or behaviors based on past demonstrations of those same
behaviors.”93 Reputation can be especially valuable when it is difficult for
consumers to evaluate the quality of a good or service. In that situation, a
consumer may give significant weight to a producer’s past behavior and
how others have assessed it. It can be hard for a client to evaluate the
quality of legal services that firms are likely to provide, especially when
several firms seem able to do the work.94 An unblemished reputation may
make the difference in some cases. It is an asset that can be threatened
when firms rely on outside providers; a single botched assignment could
damage the firm’s reputation for high-quality work in comparison to that of
its peers. As professionals trained to anticipate and advise on how to

92. Geis, supra note 24, at 962.
93. JOEL M. PODOLNY, STATUS SIGNALS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF MARKET
COMPETITION 13 (2005).
94. This is true for professional services generally. As Jay Lorsch and Thomas Tierney
observe, “it is exceptionally difficult to measure the quality of professional services, much
less the actual value they add. In many client relationships, the professionals work so
closely with their client counterparts that it’s hard to say at the end of the day who did what,
client or service provider.” JAY W. LORSCH & THOMAS J. TIERNEY, ALIGNING THE STARS:
HOW TO SUCCEED WHEN PROFESSIONALS DRIVE RESULTS 17 (2002).
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control risks, lawyers may be loath to relinquish the control that ostensibly
comes from having tasks performed within a single organization.
Increasing sophistication in outsourcing arrangements may assuage this
concern to some extent. George Geis suggests that outsourcing has grown
significantly in the last several years in part because of the emergence of
various ways in which firms can address agency costs.95 One such strategy,
for instance, is staged contractual commitment, whereby firms initially
outsource only a small amount of work and keep contracts relatively brief
in duration.96 As time goes on, and the outsource service provider shows
itself to be more trustworthy, contract length tends to expand, as does direct
monitoring of the outsourced projects.97 Other approaches include inducing
competition and enhancing evaluation by performing some of the work
inside the firm, or contracting with multiple suppliers; providing financial
incentives to meet certain performance benchmarks and achieve cost
savings; and providing for explicit monitoring, control, and exit rights.98
Finally, a firm may decide to take ownership of a “captive” outsourcing
company. This can significantly lessen concerns about quality and potential
opportunism, as well as achieve cost savings, but does not give a firm the
full benefits of being able to adjust its workforce in response to variations in
demand.99
Finally, even if quality of service is not an issue, law firms may be wary
of outsourcing because of concerns about status. While reputation
represents expectations based on past behavior, status reflects an actor’s
position in a hierarchy of value.100 Honda has a reputation for producing
high-quality automobiles, for instance, but it has a lower status than
Mercedes among automobile companies. Podolny suggests that consumers
use status to evaluate a good or service when “the existence of a reputation
for a valued quality does not necessarily eliminate the uncertainty that
market participants have about the presence or extent of that valued
quality.”101 The greater the uncertainty about a firm’s product, the more
likely the consumer is to infer quality from status. Imagine, for instance,
that a passenger is given the choice of flying on an airplane manufactured
by Mercedes or by Honda. Both companies have reputations for producing
vehicles of good quality. The passenger is likely to choose the plane
manufactured by Mercedes, however, because of its higher status, from
which she infers superior airplane quality.
A crucial feature of status is that it is dependent on associations and
relationships with others. Those of high status (and those who aspire to it)
95. See Geis, supra note 24, at 962; see also Ravi Aron et al., Monitoring Process
Quality in Off-Shore Outsourcing: A Model and Findings from Multi-country Survey, 26 J.
OPERATIONS MGMT. 303, 305 (2008).
96. See Geis, supra note 24, at 984–89.
97. See id. at 988.
98. Id. at 983–84.
99. Id. at 965–66.
100. PODOLNY, supra note 93, at 13.
101. Id. at 18.
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are careful to associate only with those of comparable status. If a highstatus actor associates with a low-status one, the former loses status while
the other gains it. Tiffany & Co., for instance, preserves its status by selling
only certain items made by particular producers. It would risk losing status
if it began to sell plastic necklaces, or jewelry by manufacturers whose
goods are sold at Wal-Mart, despite the fact that its reputation would
suggest that these products would be of high quality.
Status traditionally has been important to law firms because of the
difficulty in assessing the value of legal services. Law firms who seek to
attain or maintain high status, for instance, will eschew or abandon certain
practice areas because they are not regarded as sufficiently prestigious. One
example is Dechert LLP, which decided to let its state tax practice go, even
though it was generating $10 million a year in revenue. The reason was
because the practice was not seen as compatible with the firm’s goal of
being one of the ten to twenty firms that would represent the world’s largest
companies in their most important matters.102 It is not hard to imagine that
some firms might be reluctant to engage in outsourcing on their own
initiative for fear that openly associating with companies who do routine or
commodity work will tarnish their status.
This reluctance may fade, however, for two reasons. First, clients are
devising ways of evaluating many law firm services. To the extent that this
reduces uncertainty about quality, clients presumably will rely less on status
as a basis for their selection of firms. Second, prestigious law firms such as
members of the Magic Circle and others have begun to rely more
substantially on outsourcing.103
Indeed, Clifford Chance recently
announced that it was hiring two lawyers from its legal support center in
Gurgaon as associates in the firm.104 This suggests that firms may be able
to engage in this practice without suffering a diminution in status, because
102. See Julie Triedman, Top Design, AM. LAW., May 2007, at 135. It is true that the
firm could not charge fees for state tax work that are as high as those for high-end corporate
work, but there is a close relationship between price and status in which it is difficult to tease
out which variable causes the other.
103. See Kit Chellel, Slaughters in Talks over Outsourcing Plans, LAWYER, Oct. 5, 2009,
http://www.thelawyer.com/slaughters-in-talks-over-outsourcing-plans/1002151.article; Kian
Ganz, Clifford Chance Offshore Indian Lawyers Work on 300 Deals, LEGALLY INDIA.COM,
Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.legallyindia.com/20090925213/Law-firms/Clifford-Chanceoffshore-Indian-lawyers-work-on-300-deals;
Luke
McLeod-Roberts, A&O
Signs
Outsourcing Deal with LPO Provider Integreon, LAWYER, Nov. 18, 2009,
http://www.thelawyer.com/ao-signs-outsourcing-deal-with-lpo-providerintegreon/1002662.article; Claire Ruckin, Leading City Firms in Talks To Bring in Teams of
Contract Lawyers, LEGAL WK., Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.legalweek.com/legalweek/news/1560094/leading-city-firms-talks-bring-teams; Emma Sandowski, Eight More
U.K. Top 30 Firms Size Up Legal Outsourcing Moves, AM. LAW., Nov. 23, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202435664784.
104. Clifford Chance Promotes Two Lawyers from LPO into Firm, LEGALLY INDIA.COM,
Nov. 23, 2009, http://www.legallyindia.com/20091123301/Legal-Process-OutsourcingLPO/Clifford-Chance-promotes-two-lawyers-from-LPO-into-firm. The two will join the
firm at the level of newly qualified lawyers. Id. One will work with the firm’s Abu Dhabi
capital markets team, while the other will work in the banking group in London. Id.
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outsourcing is becoming a standard expectation of clients. It does remain to
be seen, however, whether firms whose brands are less established will be
able to take the initiative without any loss of status.
4. Summary
Law firms appear able to some degree to undertake the decomposition of
their services that scholarship on the make or buy decision indicates is
necessary for outsourcing. Clients and LPOs will provide both templates
and competitive incentive for firms to expand these efforts. Fluidity in
defining legal service outputs—and therefore inputs—may require
especially close ongoing integration of decomposed services with more
complex activities. In addition, the relevance of asset specificity will
require law firm leaders to devote more attention to the question of what
distinctive services law firms in general and their own firms in particular
can provide.
Finally, uncertainty about the performance of outside suppliers may lead
firms in the near future to conclude that relying more on “captive” rather
than independent LPOs is worth the lesser flexibility in adjusting the size of
their workforces. For some firms, the concern may be sufficiently weighty
that they prefer to hire lawyers in staff or specialist positions in the firm
rather than rely much on LPOs. Client preferences and perceptions,
however, are likely to shape this decision to a significant degree. If clients
become more comfortable with the use of LPOs, they may begin to insist
that law firms use them more often. Firms also may believe that clients are
starting to rely more on metrics than reputation or status in evaluating law
firm services, which may ease their concern about using LPOs.
Assessing the potential future relevance of the make or buy decision for
law firms thus will require much sharper focus on the components that
constitute the provision of legal service. Furthermore, the relevance of
asset specificity to the outsourcing decision may lead to fundamental
questions about the nature of legal work. This analysis may in turn result in
the realization that many of the activities associated with providing such
services can be performed by nonlawyers, and that this universe may be
expanding. This suggests that the impact of outsourcing on lawyers’
understanding of the services they provide, on their professional identity,
and on legal education may be especially fruitful areas of research.
As manufacturing and service firms have engaged in more outsourcing,
researchers have identified specific challenges that arise when production
extends beyond the boundaries of the firm. The next part discusses some of
these challenges, which law firms will need to take into account in
determining which activities might be suitable for outsourcing.
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DISAGGREGATION
Empirical work in several disciplines has identified a number of issues
that arise for organizations as the make or buy decision becomes a
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potentially more salient feature of their operations. Much of this work has
focused in particular on the implications of relying on outsourcing as an
integral part of the production process. This section discusses research on
the challenges of ensuring that work performed outside the firm is fully
integrated into the production process; coordinating projects for which
networks of organizations are responsible; managing the transfer of
knowledge inside and outside of firms that are participants in a supply
chain; and addressing the impact of using contingent workers on an
organization’s workforce, structure, and culture. A review of this research
suggests considerations that law firms will need to assess if they begin
significantly to extend the process of providing services beyond their
formal boundaries. Discussing the research also is intended to introduce
concepts that may become increasingly relevant to law firms but that
currently are not commonly used to analyze their operations. Considering
how these concepts are applicable to law firms may prompt us to rethink
how to conceptualize these firms and what they do.
A. Process Integration
1. Overview of Research
One motive for moving from vertical integration to greater reliance on
supply chains of multiple outside providers is to reduce fixed overhead
costs. Companies that move in this direction reduce the cost of retaining
employees in charge of supervising the production of inputs. They turn to
vendors as an alternative, to obtain components designed to meet the
company’s specifications. This option gives them the flexibility to reduce
costs when demand wanes or technology changes by cutting back on orders
from suppliers, rather than incurring the costs connected with laying off
employees on the payroll.
Firms can gain this advantage by establishing a supply chain, but they
need to appreciate that this model of production does not eliminate the need
for personnel who can coordinate activities among members of the chain.
The absence of such coordination can make production more expensive and
prone to error than if the company had retained the fixed overhead costs
associated with remaining more vertically integrated.
Vertical
disintegration thus is not simply a process of hollowing out the permanent
workforce and replacing it with outside contractors. As three scholars have
observed, “disintegration . . . can be viewed as the ‘other side of the coin’ of
systems integration. Firms can only outsource if they acquire the capability
to integrate the components, knowledge, or software then produced by their
specialist suppliers and subcontractors.”105
In manufacturing, for instance, some theorists suggest that the creation of
modular components and standard protocols that specify how they relate to
105. Michael Hobday, Andrew Davies & Andrea Prencipe, Systems Integration: A Core
Capability of the Modern Corporation, 14 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1109, 1124 (2005).
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one another minimizes the need for any overarching managerial authority
over the process. The argument is that the transfer of codified information
embedded in components of the production chain can smoothly coordinate
decentralized activities.106 In this way, the “modular architecture” of the
production process ostensibly obviates the need for traditional oversight.
Critics of this view point out, however, that there are limits to the ability
of modularity to substitute for managerial coordination. “[T]he ‘digitizing’
of a product’s characteristics by designers involves simplification, and
digitized models must subsequently be ‘re-actualized’ by the human teams
responsible for production.”107 As a result, “many production processes
still require close personal contacts involving the transfer of tacit
knowledge.”108 Furthermore, even if a production process could be
completely modularized, it would operate as a closed system incapable of
adjusting to new circumstances. Firms need the ability to modify
production in response to changing conditions and new information.
Echoing a point made earlier, higher-order problem solving capacity is
necessary in order to decompose production in new ways with different
modules in order to respond to such challenges. While firms may reduce
the number of components that they directly produce, they need to retain a
broad base of knowledge in order to engage in ongoing problem solving. In
other words, they need to “know more than they make.”109
Moving beyond the coordination and design of components that a
company outsources, integration also requires the capacity to determine
what activities at various steps of the supply chain should be produced
internally or by outside vendors.
Advances in information and
communications technology mean that firms increasingly are engaged on an
ongoing basis in make or buy decisions. The ability to make these
decisions requires a broad perspective on the firm’s strategies and needs, for
which the information embedded in a modular production process cannot
substitute. Having such a broad perspective “enable[s] firms to move
selectively up- and downstream in the marketplace through the
simultaneous ‘twin’ processes of vertical integration and disintegration,” so
that they can “gain the advantages of both outsourcing and vertical
integration through different phases of the product life cycle.”110

106. See Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge
Management in Product and Organization Design, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63, 70–73
(1996).
107. Hobday et al., supra note 105, at 1127.
108. Id.
109. Stefano Brusoni, Andrea Prencipe & Keith Pavitt, Knowledge Specialization,
Organizational Coupling, and the Boundaries of the Firm: Why Do Firms Know More Than
They Make?, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 597, 597 (2001); see also Ove Granstrand, Pari Patel &
Keith Pavitt, Multi-technology Corporations: Why They Have “Distributed” Rather Than
“Distinctive Core” Competencies, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 22–24 (1997) (noting that large
firms are more diversified in technologies that they master than in the products that they
make).
110. Hobday et al., supra note 105, at 1111 (footnote omitted).
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The capability to engage successfully in this process is becoming an
important asset for many leading companies. As one scholar puts it with
respect to offshoring, for instance, “the knowledge and skills associated
with the complex activity of determining which services to offshore
outsource, where, to whom and how to structure the relationship may be an
important source of competitive advantage . . . . that the firm should protect,
just like any type of intellectual property.”111 Furthermore, some
companies not only cultivate these skills for their own activities but are
developing project coordination and integration expertise that they can
market to other companies.
Some research suggests that lead firms may need to maintain a
significant capacity to perform work inside the firm in order to integrate
effectively activities by multiple providers on a project. In construction
projects in which tasks within a stage are highly interdependent, for
instance, one study indicates that there are fewer cost overruns in a stage
when the lead firm does most of the work in that stage than if a contractor
does so, or the work is evenly divided between the lead firm and the
contractor.112 When stages are highly interdependent, this division of work
has the same impact on cost overruns in subsequent project stages. The
authors conclude, “[W]hen the bulk of highly interdependent activities were
performed outside the owners’ firm boundaries, owners experienced the
most problems controlling projects and, as a result, experienced the highest
cost overruns.”113
More generally, the authors note that in other sectors “coordination and
control issues arising from the division of work and responsibilities across
organizational boundaries have been blamed for a plethora of highly visible
In complex projects with
project failures and challenges.”114
interdependent phases, coordinating work among organizational units
requires considerable information-processing capabilities. The challenge is
magnified because outsourced activities in such projects generally do not
provide standard products or services but are customized for the project.
This means that the information that must be exchanged tends to be
idiosyncratic. Furthermore, the larger the number of participants in the
supply chain, the greater the “extended interorganizational negotiation
[that] will be necessary to resolve disagreements.”115
Moving from vertical integration to greater reliance on a supply chain,
therefore, may result in a reduction in a firm’s permanent workforce, but the
firm must have the capacity to integrate the work of multiple producers
without the benefit of a single organizational hierarchy. In addition, there
111. Ellram et al., supra note 60, at 160–61.
112. See generally Pamsy P. Hui, Alison Davis-Blake & Joseph P. Broschak, Managing
Interdependence: The Effects of Outsourcing Structure on the Performance of Complex
Projects, 39 DECISION SCI. 5 (2008).
113. Id. at 24.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id. at 8.
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may be some cases in which effective integration requires that the firm
retain the ability to perform a substantial amount of the work itself. For
these reasons, a less vertically integrated firm cannot afford simply to be a
hollow organization that delegates responsibilities to contractual partners.
2. Law Firms
To the extent that disaggregation becomes more common in legal
services, process integration capability will become increasingly important.
Richard Susskind suggests,
[I]n the future, one individual organization will, I believe, tend to take
overall responsibility for the delivery of the completed and delivered legal
service when multi-sourced, even though several organizations and
systems may have contributed. This organization may be a form of main
contractor, acting as the overall project manager of the service, and so
coordinating all the various inputs. This contractor will lend its brand to
the exercise, thus securing the confidence of the purchaser. And, further,
this contractor-manager will establish quality systems and procedures to
ensure that the work is undertaken to an appropriate standard.116

This development could create market opportunities for law firms. Some
global law firms, such as the Magic Circle firms, may already provide this
service for large transnational matters. Other law firms that develop this
capability could follow. Susskind points out, however, that other types of
organizations could do so as well, such as large accounting, software, or
publishing firms. In the latter scenario, law firms might “be relegated to the
function of technical legal subcontractor.”117
Even on the more modest scale of individual projects, law firms may
need to develop better project management skills than many currently
possess. Lawyers generally receive no exposure to management principles
in law school, and few of them receive any systematic training in law firms.
Lawyers who serve in management positions in firms usually do so on the
basis of their work as practicing lawyers, since there is no established track
within firms for attorneys who are interested in moving into positions of
authority. Lawyers who coordinate the work of litigation or transactional
teams also tend to be successful lawyers who have good relationships with
clients, rather than those who have demonstrated the ability to manage
projects. The qualities that are valuable in building a successful law
practice are not necessarily those that make for an effective manager.
Furthermore, to the extent that lawyers do have experience in
coordinating the work of project teams, those teams largely consist of
members of the same firm. In these situations, lawyers can rely on a
hierarchical structure of authority to manage the work of team members.
While increasing disaggregation is creating teams with more diverse
organizational affiliations, lawyers generally have only limited experience
116. SUSSKIND, supra note 33, at 50–51.
117. Id. at 51.
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coordinating the work of a large number of service providers across
multiple organizational boundaries.
Firms in recent years have hired increasing numbers of nonlawyers in
administrative positions within the firm. These employees could be in a
position to assume project management responsibilities. Currently,
however, they mainly help manage the business side of the firm, working
on financial or strategic planning rather than exercising any oversight over
project teams. The fact that they are not lawyers might make it difficult for
them to assume the latter responsibility, since many lawyers may resist any
effort by a nonlawyer to direct any of their work. Indeed, ethical rules are
designed to limit the ability of nonlawyers to influence a lawyer’s provision
of legal services to a client. Rule 5.4(d)(2) of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, for instance, states that a lawyer shall not practice in
an organization in which a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer or
occupies any similar position of authority.118 We may need to rethink such
rules so that they apply only to efforts to influence a lawyer’s professional
judgment, rather than to those cases in which a nonlawyer is in a position of
authority over a team that contains lawyers among its members.
B. Networks
1. Overview of Research
Another aspect of pressures toward disaggregation is the emergence of
networks as the locus of production in many economic sectors.
Traditionally, the production process occurs within a single firm,
orchestrated by a command and control decision process based on
organizational rules. As transaction costs of exchanges with outside parties
decline, firms may turn more to markets to obtain inputs that formerly were
produced within the firm. Relationships among actors in such cases are
organized by contract. In Williamson’s terms, firms rely to varying degrees
on hierarchies and markets as ways of organizing production.119
With advances in information and communications technology,
companies increasingly can rely on a variety of specialized outside firms to
produce various components, with the lead company assuming the role of
assembling the final pieces or simply marketing the product to end users.
As Walter Powell puts it, more and more firms are involved in an “intricate
latticework” of collaborations with outsiders that spreads the core activities
of the firm across a wider array of participants.120 This process of vertical
disintegration creates a supply chain that often stretches across the globe, as

118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d)(2) (2009).
119. WILLIAMSON, supra note 31, at xi.
120. Powell, supra note 10, at 58.
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companies seek out the firms that are the most cost-efficient and innovative
to furnish various links in the chain.121
The relationships that emerge in this process extend across the
boundaries of any single firm. At the same time, they involve a degree of
collaboration, cooperation, and ongoing reliance that distinguishes them
from standard arms-length transactions in the spot market. Firms deal with
one another based on expectations of continuing involvement, equipped
with distinctive knowledge about each other’s operations and requirements.
This can both enhance productive efficiency and provide the foundation for
innovation as new technologies, needs, and markets develop. As a
consequence,
fixing the boundaries of an organization becomes a nearly impossible
task, as relationships with suppliers, subcontractors, and even competitors
evolve in unexpected ways. As these network ties proliferate and deepen,
it becomes more sensible to exercise voice rather than exit. A mutual
orientation between parties may be established, based on knowledge that
the parties assume each has about the other and upon which they draw in
communication and problem solving. Fixed contracts are thus ineffectual,
as expectations, rather than being frozen, change as circumstances
dictate.122

As the interorganizational network becomes a basic unit of analysis,
firms respond by entering into relational contracts that intentionally leave
some terms open and subject to mutual definition by the parties as
circumstances evolve. In other words, they do not rely wholly on either
hierarchies or markets to organize production.
Perhaps the paradigmatic form of a network is the Japanese vertical
keiretsu, found in both the manufacturing and services sectors.123 This is a
group of several hundred companies organized under the aegis of a single
final assembler or service provider. The most successful industries that
employ this form are automobile and electrical equipment companies.
Group members consist mainly of two types of companies: first, those that
formerly were divisions or departments of the lead firm, which have been
spun off as separate companies, and, second, formerly independent
companies that have developed a long-term relationship with the lead firm,
often as a supplier.
In the manufacturing sector, the lead firm focuses on high-end
manufacturing, consisting mainly of final assembly, and on research and
development for core businesses of the keiretsu. Other firms produce and
assemble components by using simpler subcomponents produced by other
affiliates that comprise a supply chain spanning the formal boundaries of
several organizations. While group members are preferred suppliers, the
121. See Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN.
REV. SOC. 57, 57–58 (1998).
122. Powell, supra note 10, at 59.
123. D. Eleanor Westney, Japanese Enterprise Faces the Twenty-First Century, in THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM, supra note 10, at 118.
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lead firm also obtains some components from companies outside the
keiretsu. This practice “disciplines pricing on both sides” and permits
suppliers to “build larger scale economies than would be possible for a
captive supplier.”124
The keiretsu is only the most prominent example of how disaggregation
and multisourcing is leading to the demise of the vertically integrated firm
in several industries. This trend is most evident in sectors subject to rapid
technological change, where companies need to retain flexibility and avoid
incurring significant overhead costs for processes or products that may
become obsolete. Such a development can change the nature of
competition itself, since “selection increasingly operates at the network
level as rivalry shifts from firm-versus-firm to coalition-versuscollaboration.”125
2. Law Firms
Within the legal services sector, corporate legal departments have done
more than law firms to utilize the network as a unit of production. These
departments regularly must decide whether to make or buy legal services
and have outsourced work to law firms for many years. They use a variety
of outside firms to provide legal services to their companies, typically
relying on different firms for expertise in particular specialties. In recent
years, corporations have begun to reduce the number of outside firms they
use, creating preferred provider networks consisting in some cases of a
handful of firms.126 In return for a guarantee of a certain amount of
business, firms who win the competition to participate in these networks
agree to share work product with all other preferred firms and to work with
the client to explore fee arrangements that provide predictable legal costs,
create incentives for efficient service delivery, and assign to the firms some
of the risks of the representation. Such a network reflects reliance on
relational contracts to govern relationships that are neither wholly located
within the company nor simple arms-length spot market transactions.
Corporations also have been the most active users of LPOs, sending
considerable amounts of routine legal work to vendors in lower-cost
locations such as India and the Philippines. Many insist that their outside
law firms utilize such vendors in their representations of the company, and
some clients designate particular LPOs that firms must use. In this way,
corporations begin to construct supply chains consisting of a variety of
outside entities that focus on discrete aspects of a given legal representation.
Efficiency pressures have begun to move law firms in recent years to
look outside their organizations for providers who can perform specific
tasks connected with representation. Firms increasingly use contract
124. Id. (citation omitted).
125. Powell, supra note 10, at 68.
126. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067 (2010).
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lawyers for relatively routine work that used to be done by associates, and
are likely to use them even more in the future to avoid the excess capacity
that has required layoffs at many firms during the recent recession. Firms
are also using LPOs for services such as document review, factual analysis,
and legal research. Furthermore, the complexity and expense of electronic
discovery has led a large number of firms to rely on e-discovery vendors
and information technology specialty companies as key members of
litigation teams. Firms also may assemble lawyers from more than one firm
to handle large litigation or transactions, with each firm focusing on a
particular aspect of the engagement, such as discovery, settlement, or
courtroom advocacy. When a matter raises issues in a jurisdiction in which
a firm does not have an office or a substantial presence, the firm may rely
on a referral network to identify someone who can work on that aspect of
the matter.127
Corporate legal departments will likely continue to use networks for the
provision of legal services more frequently than law firms. First, they are
part of larger business organizations in which outsourcing is both accepted
and encouraged. Second, as is any business unit of a company, they are
subject to continuing pressures to hold down costs and operate efficiently.
Their current reliance on networks is a direct response to these pressures,
reflecting the opportunities that advances in communications and
information technology have made available. The goal of achieving
efficiencies also has prompted departments to develop more sophisticated
benchmarks and metrics to use in evaluating, pricing, and monitoring the
provision of legal services, expertise that will be useful as the trend toward
disaggregation continues. Finally, legal departments are regarded as cost
centers or support functions within the larger corporation, as opposed to
activities that constitute the core of a company’s business. Conventional
management theory argues that such noncore functions are especially
suitable for make or buy decisions.128
Continuing and perhaps increasing use of networks by legal departments
means that corporate counsel may begin to function more as general
contractors who coordinate activities among a multitude of suppliers that
make contributions at various points in the legal services value chain. If so,
project management skills will become more important for such lawyers, as
will the ability to structure governance arrangements that align incentives as
much as possible among network members. Departments may also turn
more to nonlawyers with such skills, much as many have come to rely on
corporate procurement officers in negotiating the terms of law firm
engagements.
Law firms also are likely to rely more on networks to provide legal
services in response to increasing pressure from clients to be cost-efficient.
127. The Lex Mundi network of 21,000 lawyers in 160 firms around the world is the most
extensive such network. See Lex Mundi, http://www.lexmundi.com/lexmundi/Default.asp
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
128. See Sako, supra note 9, at 3–4.
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There may be features of law firm practice, however, that limit how
extensive these networks become. First, of course, legal services are a core
function of a law firm, not support services. While there are some
exceptions, conventional management theory generally maintains that an
organization should be cautious in outsourcing such an activity.
Second, as our previous discussion has suggested, law firms may have
some concern that contracting with outside vendors to help provide services
will undermine their reputation and status.129 They may fear that using
more outside suppliers runs the risk of damaging their reputation because of
the difficulty in ensuring that such providers deliver exemplary service.
They may also be wary that association with entities that do commodity
work will diminish their image of providing services that require irreducible
intellectual sophistication and complex judgment.
Law firms may be especially concerned about their ability to supervise
vendors adequately because of the risk that contractors could be charged
with the unauthorized practice of law. LPOs are now engaged in activities
that lawyers performed a decade ago or less. They avoid unauthorized
practice claims by maintaining that they compile and synthesize
information that lawyers use in providing legal services.
This
characterization is tenable as long as lawyers are involved in supervising
the work of contractors. State bar authorities vary in their approach to
unauthorized practice, however, which creates uncertainty about the level of
supervision deemed adequate and the extent of contractor discretion that is
deemed sufficient to avoid violating bar rules.
One final consideration that could limit law firm reliance on networks is
that decisions about staffing tend to be made in firms on a decentralized
basis by partners in charge of the various matters that the firm handles. To
the extent that firms currently rely on networks, these networks tend to exist
for specific projects and may not continue for matters involving different
lawyers or clients. The use of networks as a unit of production thus varies
among lawyers and practices within a firm, with origination and
engagement partners likely to be most influential in determining whether to
create and rely on them.
This can make it difficult for a firm to pursue a consistent policy
regarding the use of outside service providers. Individual partners’
willingness to work with providers will vary, and will be influenced
significantly by a client’s attitude toward such collaboration. The extent to
which this continues to be an obstacle will depend in large measure on how
widely clients insist on fee arrangements that depart from hourly billing and
create incentives for efficient delivery of services. If these arrangements
become common practice, they could generate the support from influential
partners that law firm management needs to implement a standard approach
to the creation of networks to provide legal services.

129. See supra notes 93–104 and accompanying text.
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In sum, as disaggregation of legal services continues, we may see some
vertical disintegration among providers who rely more on a network of
outside parties to obtain the inputs they need to deliver services to clients.
This trend may be especially prominent among corporate legal departments,
who have both comfort and expertise with it. While law firms may be more
cautious, efficiency pressures and greater client reliance on metrics, rather
than reputation and status, in selecting outside firms may begin to lessen
their resistance.
C. Knowledge Transfer
1. Overview of Research
Two scholars of outsourcing suggest that “the most significant impact of
contingent work may be on the knowledge stock of the firm and, through
that, on its long-term competitive position.”130 Outsourcing can result in
the transfer of knowledge into the firm from outside suppliers who provide
access to emerging best practices and innovative approaches to producing
goods and services. It also can create the risk that knowledge that
constitutes part of a firm’s competitive advantage will be disclosed to
outside parties and the public at large. Firms therefore ideally structure
outsourcing arrangements so as to maximize the likelihood of acquiring
new knowledge that they can convert into an organizational asset and to
minimize the prospect that the firm will transfer knowledge to parties
outside the firm that can jeopardize its competitive position.131
Sharon Matusik and Charles Hill provide a taxonomy of knowledge that
helps clarify the opportunities and risks a firm may encounter when
involved in outsourcing. They first distinguish between private knowledge
that is unique to a firm and public knowledge that is not. The latter
includes items such as industry and occupational best practices and
language skills. It cannot serve as a source of competitive advantage
because it is available to all firms, but a firm’s failure to use it can put it at a
disadvantage.
A firm’s private knowledge consists of components and architectural
knowledge. Components relate to discrete aspects of an organization’s
operations, such as processes for new product development, inventory
management, and customer billing. It may be explicit or tacit. The former
is codified and transferable in formal systematic methods, such as rules and
procedures, and the knowledge and skills associated with it easily can be
taught or written down. The latter is learned through experience and
difficult to articulate, formalize, and transfer smoothly to others.
Knowledge of components may be held on the individual or collective
level.
130. Sharon F. Matusik & Charles W. L. Hill, The Utilization of Contingent Work,
Knowledge Creation, and Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 680, 681 (1998).
131. See generally Ellram et al., supra note 60; Matusik & Hill, supra note 130.

2170

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

By contrast, architectural knowledge consists of organization-wide
routines and schemas for coordinating various components and putting
them to productive use. It is held tacitly and collectively, since no one
individual is in a position to see, comprehend, and describe the totality of
this form of knowledge. Component knowledge is embedded within and
influenced by architectural knowledge and can be upgraded by architectural
knowledge over time. As an example of the latter process, Matusik and Hill
suggest that Toyota’s architectural knowledge base emphasizes continual
improvement in component processes through ongoing feedback on
performance, which in turn regularly results in improvements in discrete
components.132 They argue that “over the long run it is architectural
knowledge that contributes most to an organization’s long-run competitive
position.”133
Outsourcing partners can be an important source of new public and
private knowledge for a firm. As an example of the former, outside
workers may expose a firm to new best practices by virtue of working on
projects with a variety of firms. Their work in a number of different
organizational settings may increase their depth of knowledge about such
practices. They may be especially likely to be familiar with the most
current ways of doing things since their skills tend to be evaluated by the
market more often than those of employees who work for a single firm.
Outsourcing arrangements, therefore, may serve to provide firms with
access to new public knowledge in the form of industry- and occupationspecific best practices that are available to their competitors.
Outside workers also may stimulate the creation of new private
knowledge within a firm. Matusik and Hill suggest three ways in which
this may occur. First, outside workers may be more likely than firm
employees to try new processes and develop ideas that are “outside of an
organization’s repertoire of routines.”134 Second, the presence of new
workers may prompt employees to make tacit knowledge more explicit as
they explain to outside workers how things are done, thereby allowing a
firm to draw on and disseminate routines and practices, as well as to
reexamine them. Finally, outside workers may bring into the firm public
knowledge, which is combined with existing private knowledge to create
new ideas and practices. In scientific invention, for instance, “[t]he fusion
of formerly distinct technologies into new ones is a recognized source of
innovation.”135
132. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 685. See generally LIKER, supra note 85.
133. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 685 (citations omitted); see also Robert M. Grant,
Prospering in Dynamically-Competitive Environments: Organizational Capability as
Knowledge Integration, 7 ORG. SCI. 375, 375 (1996); Rebecca Henderson & Iain Cockburn,
Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects in Pharmaceutical Research, 15
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 63, 65 (1994); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge
of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. SCI. 383,
394–96 (1992).
134. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 687.
135. Id. at 688.
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Mere exposure to new knowledge, however, does not ensure that a firm
will be able to convert it into an organizational asset. Matusik and Hill
observe that, “[b]ecause grafting knowledge from the outside environment
does not take place automatically, a firm needs mechanisms to bring public
knowledge in, to transmit this knowledge within the firm, and to fuse the
new knowledge with existing stocks of knowledge.”136 Such integrative
mechanisms may include the creation of “boundary spanning” positions that
serve as liaisons between the firm and outside suppliers, officially
developing a strategy and committing resources explicitly for the purpose
of obtaining new knowledge from outside partners, providing incentives to
employees to acquire and use new knowledge, and encouraging outside
workers to share information by providing rewards that may include the
possibility of permanent employment with the firm.
Firms also may need to take steps to overcome employee perception of
the inferiority of contingent workers in order to enhance the flow of
knowledge into the firm. These steps may include creating teams of
permanent and outside workers in settings that involve interdependence, as
well as high-profile announcements of ways in which the acquisition and
integration of outside knowledge has improved the performance of the firm.
Firms concerned about lessening devaluation of outside workers will need
to be rigorous in dismissing such workers who do not have the necessary
skills and knowledge base.
Outsourcing also creates the risk that a firm’s stock of private knowledge
will be disseminated outside the firm. Disclosure is likely to be of
component knowledge, since outside workers are more likely to be exposed
to knowledge related to specific tasks than to a company’s entire repertoire
of routines, and because architectural knowledge cannot be grasped fully by
any one individual. As private component knowledge is converted into
public knowledge, a firm may lose an important competitive asset. Other
firms may simply copy the knowledge. They may, for instance, adopt
certain procedures or employ particular analytical techniques that enhance
productivity. In attempting to imitate, they also may innovate. Such
innovation can render obsolete the knowledge that has been disclosed
outside the firm. In addition, if a supplier comes to know aspects of a
business better than the lead firm, it may expand its operations and become
a competitor.137
These concerns indicate that firms should take explicit steps to minimize
the risk that outsourcing will result in the transfer of private firm knowledge
to competitors and the public. Such steps can include using nondisclosure
agreements; restricting access to manuals, documents, and sensitive
information; segregating sensitive functions and activities from outside
workers; monitoring the type of knowledge that suppliers obtain; and
limiting the length of contingent worker contracts or converting such
136. Id. at 685; see also George P. Huber, Organizational Learning: The Contributing
Processes and the Literatures, 2 ORG. SCI. 88, 91–92 (1991).
137. See Ellram et al., supra note 60, at 157–59.

2172

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

workers to permanent employees if they acquire important firm-specific
knowledge. Matusik and Hill also suggest that as outsourcing becomes
more prevalent, especially in sensitive professional and technical areas,
reputational markets may become important as constraints on dissemination
of private information by outside workers.138
Another risk of outsourcing connected with knowledge transfer is related
to the concept of asset specificity discussed earlier. A firm may require that
certain forms of knowledge be developed that are tailored specifically to its
operations. An organization that relies on outside suppliers to develop this
knowledge without significant involvement by the organization’s
employees can become dependent on a supplier and make itself vulnerable
to opportunism. This is especially a risk if the knowledge that the outside
party acquires is tacit knowledge, which is “gained in a learning-by-doing
mode”139 and is “difficult to recreate and transfer.”140 As a result,
economic theory suggests that the more firm-specific an asset, the less
likely a firm is to rely on outsourcing to obtain it.
Some research suggests, however, that firms may not be as sensitive to
this risk as they should be. Interviews with a group of high-ranking
corporate procurement officers led researchers in one study to conclude that
firms “are careful to avoid outsourcing of specific physical assets, but do
not show the same level of concern for outsourcing specific knowledge
assets.”141 They describe two examples in which firms outsourced tasks
that required the acquisition of high levels of firm-specific knowledge. In
one case, a software company spent more than four weeks training its
offshore call center workers how to respond to highly technical questions
related directly to its product. This type of knowledge is costly to develop
and cannot be recovered if the firm decides to use a different supplier. Yet
the firm chose to rely on outside workers rather than employees to acquire
and apply the knowledge.
Another case involved a finance company that outsourced some of its
software programming and began encountering price and service problems
with the company performing the work. When it sought to change
suppliers, it discovered that it was highly dependent on the existing one.
Specifically, “[o]ver time, the organization had lost its internal knowledge
to understand the program code, and even the knowledge to develop a clear
statement of work to effectively re-bid the item.”142 This meant that the
firm found it difficult to identify other suppliers that could provide the same
service, thus incurring the risk of locking itself into a relationship in which
the supplier had superior bargaining power.
Another risk in this situation is that a supplier may make changes to
processes and technologies without adequately informing the firm. This
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 692.
Ellram et al., supra note 60, at 160.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 153.
Id.
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widens the knowledge gap between the firm and the supplier, which makes
it difficult for the firm to exercise effective control over the activity. More
serious is the risk that, because of its expertise, a supplier gradually may
take on additional responsibilities that begin to implicate core strategic
activities of the firm without adequate oversight. This can result in the
supplier and the firm working at cross purposes, compromising the mission
of the firm.
Another study found that a bank that had increased its use of contractors
to provide information technology services failed to be attentive to the risk
of using such workers on tasks that required a high amount of firm-specific
skills.143 Most of this work involved modifying existing software
applications. These applications had been written and rewritten over the
course of several years and generally were very poorly documented. The
systems were sufficiently complex that “knowledge of how to work with a
given application could only be acquired over time, through experience
with maintaining and modifying it. Furthermore, there was a wide enough
variety of different applications that only a few individuals might have
experience in any given application.”144 The workers therefore specialized
in a particular application or set of applications, and built up expertise on
the specific proprietary systems that they managed. As a result, “[w]hen
those contractors left, other workers would struggle to work with those
applications,” which made the company reluctant to terminate them.145
The bank’s experience illustrates that a firm that engages in outsourcing
in order to gain flexibility in staffing can negate that benefit if it delegates
to outside workers tasks that require the development of substantial firmspecific knowledge. Ignoring this consideration can effectively lock the
firm into contractual relationships that limit its ability to adjust the size of
its workforce based on changing business conditions. The implication of
this is that “knowledge can be a more powerful determinant of long term
employment than the formal governance arrangements within which that
relationship takes place.”146
Concern about the transfer of knowledge outside the organization has
been one of the major reasons that conventional theory maintains that firms
should outsource only tasks that are not integrally related to their core
competitive activities.147 On this view, “organizations should internalize
143. MATTHEW BIDWELL, SOME PITFALLS OF MANAGING TALENT ON DEMAND: A CASE
STUDY OF IT WORKERS (2009), available at http://www.industrystudies.pitt.edu/chicago09/
docs/Bidwell%202.1.pdf.
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id. at 23.
146. Id. at 25.
147. Other reasons include concern about the potential negative impact on regular
employees of using contingent workers and, because of historical precedent, the perception
that outsourcing is more legitimate for some activities, such as administrative and clerical
work, than for others. Arne L. Kalleberg & Peter V. Marsden, Externalizing Organizational
Activities: Where and How US Establishments Use Employment Intermediaries, 3 SOCIOECON. REV. 389, 392 (2005).
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their core activity areas by investing in the training and development of
employees who are strategically important to the organization”148 and
should use external sources for more peripheral functions.
Research suggests, however, that some firms are beginning to outsource
important activities that are related to core functions.149 These firms tend to
operate in dynamic environments characterized by innovation that produces
rapid changes in knowledge. Those environments are characterized by
“rapid technological change, short product cycles, and ‘creative
destruction.’”150 In such cases, remaining competitive requires that a firm
continually upgrade its stock of knowledge and avoid allowing practices
In these settings, establishing
and processes to become rigid.151
relationships with a network of outside suppliers who work on core
functions can serve to expose a firm to innovative knowledge that is vital to
the firm’s continued competitiveness.
This trend indicates that outsourcing can be prompted by a firm’s desire
to acquire knowledge, not simply by the goals of reducing costs and
increasing flexibility in the use of workers. Matusik and Hill argue that
decisions on when and how to use contingent workers should depend on (1)
the intensity of pressures for cost containment and a flexible workforce and
(2) how stable or dynamic the firm’s competitive environment is—that is,
how rapidly knowledge becomes obsolete. The more quickly knowledge
becomes obsolete, the less concern the firm should have about the risk that
outsourcing will result in disclosure of knowledge outside the firm. Their
suggestions are worth summarizing at some length:
Firms based in stable environments characterized by low competitive
pressures [should] value preserving knowledge over knowledge creation
and, thus, should make low use of contingent work. Those based in stable
environments characterized by high competitive pressures should make
use of contingent work in noncore areas if there is direct cost saving.
Firms based in dynamic environments characterized by mild competitive
pressures should make use of contingent work in the core value-creation
areas of the firm and limit its use elsewhere. Finally, those firms based in
dynamic environments characterized by intense competitive pressures

148. Id. at 394 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained
Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99, 116–17 (1991); Nesheim et al., supra note 37, at
249–50 (summarizing conventional view); C. K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core
Competence of the Corporation, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 79 (1990); see also Matusik & Hill,
supra note 130, at 690 (“In much of the existing literature, scholars recommend a cautious
stance toward the use of contingent work, advocating its use only outside of core valuecreation areas central to the attainment of competitive advantage.”).
149. See, e.g., Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 695; Torstein Nesheim, Using External
Work Arrangements in Core Value-Creation Areas, 21 EUR. MGMT. J. 528, 530 (2003).
150. Nesheim et al., supra note 37, at 250.
151. Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Testing Alternative Theories of the Firm: Transaction
Cost, Knowledge-Based, and Measurement Explanations for Make-or-Buy Decisions in
Information Services, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 853, 855–56 (1998).
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should make relatively extensive use of contingent work in both core and
noncore areas.152

Knowledge transfer thus is a significant dimension of outsourcing. At a
minimum, firms need to be aware of the risk that suppliers may be a conduit
for transmitting valuable private knowledge outside the firm. In addition,
they need to appreciate that any outsourcing arrangement contains the
potential for the firm to acquire new knowledge from outside parties, which
an organization may be able to integrate into its operations. Finally, firms
in dynamic industries in which knowledge rapidly becomes obsolete may
actively seek relationships with outside suppliers that provide them with
access to innovation and emerging best practices.
2. Law Firms
An analysis of the implications for law firms of the research on
knowledge transfer reveals that the field rarely focuses on the creation and
dissemination of knowledge when assessing legal services. In particular,
firms themselves may not sufficiently appreciate the importance of
conceptualizing their competitive assets in this way. Applying this
analytical framework to law firms therefore may be useful at this point
mainly as an impetus to begin thinking more systematically about the forms
of knowledge that firms possess and the concept of innovation in legal
services.
The first question is what stock of private knowledge a firm may have.
With respect to explicit knowledge, sources of law such as statutes,
regulations, judicial opinions, and the like are publicly available. Firms
may vary, however, in the systems they develop for keeping people
informed of new developments, as well as for organizing, retrieving,
searching, and analyzing information about legal sources. They may
compile special legal databases for particular practice groups and arrange
for regular briefings for lawyers and other people in the group. Firms also
may use distinctive ways of staffing and dividing work among members of
teams involved in litigation, transactions, legislative work, regulatory
advice and compliance, and other types of matters. They may develop
explicit knowledge in the form of due diligence checklists, standard forms
that can be modified for particular matters, document review processes,
conflicts checking systems, client intake procedures, and standard terms in
engagement letters. They also may create specific procedures for providing
feedback and evaluating performance at the end of a representation.
Firms also possess tacit knowledge in various forms. People have insight
into matters such as how to approach negotiations with various parties, how
to navigate a matter through a regulatory agency, when to use which
documents in connection with what types of cases or deals, what types of
arguments are likely to be most effective before which tribunals, the formal
152. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 691.

2176

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

and informal networks of influence inside client organizations, how clients
store and use information, the skills and expertise of various people within
the firm and in other firms, and the economics and competitive landscape of
industries in which clients operate.
These are but a few of the forms of knowledge that law firms possess that
contribute to organizational effectiveness. As firms participate more
extensively in outsourcing, their personnel also may have access to the
knowledge of suppliers and other partners that comprise a firm’s supply
chain. A firm thus will come to possess knowledge beyond what is
contained within its formal boundaries. This can make it difficult for
anyone in the firm to have enough information about the firm’s knowledge
stock to determine the risks of and opportunities for knowledge transfer in
relationships with outside agents.
This difficulty reflects the phenomenon of “distributed knowledge.” As
organizations such as firms become larger and more complex, the
knowledge they possess becomes more “distributed.”
Distributed
knowledge is knowledge “that is not possessed by any single mind, but
‘belongs to’ a group of interacting agents, somehow emerges from the
aggregation of the (possibly tacit) knowledge elements of the individual
agents, and can be mobilized for productive purposes.”153 A set of agents
thus knows something that no single agent completely knows. As a firm
comes increasingly to rely on knowledge specialists, whether employees or
outsiders, it can be conceptualized as a “distributed knowledge system.”154
Researchers suggest that this dynamic has accelerated in recent years as
firms acquire knowledge from an expanding number of disciplines, which
themselves are becoming more complex in terms of depth and
specialization.155
Awareness of the increasingly distributed character of knowledge has
prompted efforts in recent years to implement knowledge management
programs in law firms. These programs aim to identify, capture, and
distribute knowledge that firms possess so that it can be put to productive
use.156 They enable lawyers in the firm to work more efficiently by
drawing on the accumulated wisdom and products of others who have been
involved in similar projects. They can help a firm respond more quickly to
client requests, and to market its systems and processes to clients as a
153. Kirsten Foss & Nicholai J. Foss, Authority in the Context of Distributed Knowledge
1 (Danish Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 03-08, 2002), available at
http://www3.druid.dk/wp/20030008.pdf. Foss and Foss emphasize “that this does not
amount to asserting the existence of mysterious supra-individual ‘collective minds.’
Knowledge still ultimately resides in the heads of individuals; however, when this
knowledge is combined and ‘aggregated’ in certain ways, it means that considered as a
system, a set of agents possesses knowledge that they do not possess if separated.” Id. at 5.
154. Haridimos Tsoukas, The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System:
A
Constructionist Approach, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 11, 13 (1996).
155. See Granstrand et al., supra note 109, at 8.
156. GRETTA RUSANOW, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND THE SMARTER LAWYER 7
(2003).
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competitive advantage of the firm. Firms also can draw on distributed
knowledge to develop innovative products for clients, such as online
advisory services or document assembly programs.
Many programs that have been established, however, focus on capturing
explicit knowledge, with an emphasis on legal knowledge, rather than
tapping into tacit knowledge on a broad range of subjects.157 A crucial
function of knowledge management, however, is converting tacit
knowledge into explicit knowledge.158 Accomplishing this task may
require, for instance, performing an inventory of the matters on which
people in the firm have worked and the expertise that they have required,
and then creating a database that lists which people have what experience.
This should be continually updated as members of the firm work on new
matters and acquire new expertise. Some of this knowledge can be
expressed in explicit terms, while tacit knowledge can be transmitted
informally if people are aware of whom to contact for insights on what
issues. This system can enhance the ability of the firm to draw on the
knowledge distributed among its members.
Despite the advantages of more systematic knowledge management
programs, firms have tended to face some obstacles in implementing them.
Firms often have discrete rather than integrated financial, document, and
client management systems; reliance on hourly billing can limit incentives
for initiatives that can result in work being done more quickly; partner
compensation models that focus on individual revenue generation can limit
willingness to share work and expertise; members of practice groups may
have limited opportunities to interact with lawyers in other groups; and
lawyers may be concerned that their human capital will become less rare
and less valuable if they share knowledge widely with others. Law firms
will need to overcome these impediments in order to make intelligent
decisions about the knowledge transfer risks and opportunities they will
confront in working with outside suppliers.
Law firms that want to enhance their ability to acquire and integrate
knowledge from outside workers also may need to deal with employee
perceptions that such workers have little to teach the firm. Status hierarchy
is a prominent feature of the legal profession, and contingent workers
typically are accorded low status by lawyers and permanent employees
within law firms. This may lead firm members to overlook the knowledge
that contingent workers can offer on subjects such as how to organize and
review information more efficiently and how to deliver services in
innovative ways.
Assuming that firms have adequate knowledge management systems in
place and are receptive to the possibility of learning from outside workers,
what type of outsourcing strategy is likely to be attractive to them from the
standpoint of knowledge transfer? The main motives for outsourcing to
157. Id. at 71.
158. Id. at 119–34.
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date have been the desire to reduce costs and to adjust the workforce in
response to fluctuating demand. In terms of Matusik and Hill’s matrix,
firms are moving toward the intense end of the spectrum with respect to
cost and flexibility pressures. This suggests that they have placed a “high
value on knowledge preservation,” “low value on knowledge creation,”
“low value on public knowledge accumulation,” and “high value on direct
cost saving.”159 As a result, firms have used outside workers mostly for
support functions, such as handling discovery of electronic information in
litigation, reviewing documents for relevance and privileged status,
conducting legal research on discrete legal issues, and reviewing and
modifying standard transaction documents.
The other dimension of Matusik and Hill’s matrix is how dynamic a
firm’s environment is with respect to innovation and the rate at which
knowledge becomes obsolete. Law firms’ tendency to use outsourcing for
support functions suggests that they either believe they operate in an
environment characterized by low dynamism or that they simply have not
focused on this dimension. In either case, the increasing sophistication of
clients and the growing complexity of transactions and disputes suggest that
firms may gain a competitive advantage by focusing more explicitly on
possibilities to use outsourcing to acquire new knowledge that can lead to
innovation in the services they provide. Law firms, however, generally
have not placed a priority on innovation in the way that companies in many
other sectors have done. They do not, for instance, have research and
development programs,160 nor do they typically enter into the kind of joint
ventures that are common among high technology firms.161
There may be several reasons for this trend. First, many modern firms
may not be confident that they will be representing a sufficiently large
group of similar clients to make investment in innovation worthwhile.
Firms have a greater incentive to invest in research and development as it
becomes more likely that they will be able to spread its cost over a large
number of clients and capture the benefits of innovation. One of the most
notable instances of law firm innovation, for instance, was Wachtell
Lipton’s creation of the poison pill takeover defense in the 1980s.162 While
the firm developed the first version of a pill in the course of a takeover
fight, it continued to revise it independent of the needs of any particular
client.163 In this respect, Wachtell “was developing and refining the new
legal device much as a manufacturing company might modify a new
product after an initial market test.”164 The firm could do this because it
159. Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 690 tbl.1.
160. See Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Three and a Half Minutes 65–69 (Oct. 8, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
161. BENJAMIN GOMES-CASSARES, THE ALLIANCE REVOLUTION: THE NEW SHAPE OF
BUSINESS RIVALRY (1996).
162. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423, 434 (1993).
163. See id. at 436–37.
164. Id. at 437.
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was confident that it would be representing a large number of clients who
needed help fending off hostile tender offers. Similarly, Stephen Choi and
G. Mitu Gulati maintain that Cleary Gottlieb’s representation of the largest
number of issuers in sovereign bond offerings is an important reason for the
firm’s willingness to initiate significant shifts in the standard terms of such
bonds. “Attorneys handling smaller numbers of offerings,” they suggest,
“may simply lack the economies of scale to absorb the fixed costs of
generating a new term, researching the impact of the term, and bearing the
risk if the term turns out poorly for the clients.”165
Many firms today, however, have no assurance that representing a client
in a particular matter means that they will do so in similar matters in the
future. Even firms that participate in preferred provider networks are
guaranteed a certain amount of work only for a limited period of two or
three years.166 This uncertainty may decline if sole source arrangements
such as those between Tyco and Eversheds and between Levi Strauss and
Orrick become more common,167 but it is too early to say whether such
arrangements will spread or whether they will encourage law firm
investment in innovation.
Second, law firms enjoy no intellectual property protection for any
innovations they develop. A firm that designs a creative deal structure, for
instance, will lose control over that innovation the moment it distributes
documents to the parties—and their lawyers—involved in the transaction.
As soon as Wachtell Lipton developed the poison pill, “several additional
varieties of the [pill] soon appeared in the marketplace, each hawked by
different law firms extolling the virtues of their particular model.”168 This
inability to capture the lion’s share of rewards from innovation may
discourage law firms from incurring the cost of developing novel
arrangements.
Third, law firm financial structure may discourage investment in
innovation. Firms distribute their profits to partners at the end of each year.
Many do not hold back the equivalent of retained earnings for investment in
the firm, in part because of fear that profitable partners will leave for more
lucrative options at other firms. In addition, more attenuated ties between
partners and firms means that partners may not have the long-term
perspective that would support investments that might pay off only with

165. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 994 (2004).
166. On the possible movement toward more durable ongoing relationships between
corporate clients and selected law firms, see Wilkins, supra note 126.
167. See Richard Lloyd, In-House Lawyer: The Power of One, LEGAL WK., May 29,
2008, http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1168974/in-house-lawyer-the-power;
Amanda Royal, Orrick-Levi Strauss Deal Underscores Growth of Alternative Billing,
LAW.COM, Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202435773922.
168. Powell, supra note 162, at 441 (footnote omitted).
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some delay or not at all.169 Partners bear all the risk of such investment,
since firms are prohibited from having outside investors with diversified
portfolios who might be willing to take the risk that research and
development efforts might not yield a return. In addition, specialists who
serve as the engine of innovation comprise only one practice group in large
firms and must compete for resources with other groups. By contrast,
Wachtell Lipton was a firm that specialized in takeover defense when it
developed the poison pill and was able to maintain its competitive
advantage because it remained a small firm with a focused practice. A large
percentage of lawyers in the firm thus likely saw themselves as the
beneficiaries of continuing efforts to refine the pill.
Finally, law firms face obstacles to participating in networks that may be
especially likely to prompt innovation. Ronald Burt suggests that there is
particular value in networks in which a party has relationships with diverse
partners who otherwise have no connection to one another.170 Participation
in networks with such “structural holes” exposes an actor more quickly to a
broader range of information and a diversity of perspectives. This may
enable a participant to make the connections among disparate conceptual
schemes that result in innovation. Despite this potential benefit, high-status
firms may be wary that developing ties with a wide range of partners across
status boundaries will dilute their own status.171 In addition, bar rules
prohibit lawyers from practicing in multidisciplinary organizations, in
which lawyers might be exposed to diverse perspectives, and in firms in
which nonlawyers have management or ownership interests.172
Despite these potential limitations, the concept of innovation in legal
services has begun to receive more sustained attention in recent years. The
Financial Times inaugurated an annual Innovative Lawyers Report in 2006,
which has recognized and spurred alternative approaches to providing legal
services by European law firms and legal departments.173 The College of
Law Practice Management sponsors an annual InnovAction Award,174 and
the American Bar Association has published a booklet on Innovations in the
Delivery of Legal Services.175 More broadly, the topic of innovation has
169. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Papers
Series, Paper No. LE09-025, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1467730.
170. See generally RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
COMPETITION (1992).
171. PODOLNY, supra note 93, at 231.
172. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2009). For a more extensive
discussion of how regulation of the legal profession inhibits innovation, see Gillian K.
Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional
Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008).
173. See, e.g., FINANCIAL TIMES SPECIAL REPORT: FT INNOVATIVE LAWYERS (2009),
http://www.ft.com/reports/innovativelawyers2009. The Financial Times plans to launch a
report on innovation in U.S. law firms in the near future.
174. College of Law Practice Management, InnovAction:
About the Awards,
http://www.innovactionaward.com/abouttheawards.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
175. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., ABA, INNOVATIONS IN THE
DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES: ALTERNATIVE AND EMERGING MODELS FOR THE PRACTICING
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become a more prominent focus in the legal press176 and the legal
academy.177 None of this ensures that innovation will occur, of course, but
increasing attention to what the concept means in legal services enhances
the likelihood that at least some firms will rethink the way they do business.
It is difficult to say how intensely innovative an environment in legal
services might emerge, but to the extent that it does, firms will place a
higher value on knowledge creation and the accumulation of public
knowledge.178 Greater research on and attention to the concept of
innovation could increase firms’ interest in using outside workers as a
vehicle for acquiring new advanced knowledge that can be used in the
performance of core functions. At a minimum, it would help clarify the
ways in which knowledge is created, sustained, and rendered obsolete in the
legal services industry.
D. Use of Contingent Workers
1. Introduction
As outsourcing increases in response to pressures to decompose tasks and
assign them to the most cost-efficient providers, firms use a larger number
of contingent workers who are not permanent employees to perform a
variety of functions. This practice can produce benefits by increasing the
flexibility of firms in adjusting personnel costs to changes in demand.
Firms need to be aware, however, that the use of contingent workers can
produce significant changes throughout an organization:
Outsourcing changes the nature of tasks, the design of jobs, and the
design of subunits and interunit relationships, thus changing the
experience of employment, including the tasks that individuals perform,
whom individuals interact with when performing their work and the
nature and frequency of that interaction, and the compensation individuals
receive for their work.179

Alison Davis-Blake and Joseph Broschak provide a comprehensive
review of research on the impact of outsourcing on permanent employees,
LAWYER (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/delivery/
innovations.pdf.
176. See, e.g., Adam Smith, Esq., “Innovation in Legal Services” Sponsored by Allen &
Overy,
http://www.adamsmithesq.com/archives/2008/06/innovation-in-legal-servi.html
(June 3, 2008, 9:47 EST); Andrew Zangrilli, Client Driven Innovations in Legal Services—
The State of the Legal Profession, Part 1, FINDLAW, http://practice.findlaw.com/lawpractice-management-articles/00006/000447.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
177. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 172. For a fascinating discussion of the possibilities
for collaborative work on developing contract innovations, see George Triantis,
Collaborative Contract Collaboration (Nov. 10, 2009) (unpublished article, on file with
authors) (discussing The Harvard Law School Contracts Wiki, http://ackwiki.com/drupal/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010)).
178. See Matusik & Hill, supra note 130, at 690.
179. Alison Davis-Blake & Joseph P. Broschak, Outsourcing and the Changing Nature of
Work, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 321, 322 (2009).
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work group dynamics, job design, and organizational structure and
culture.180 They divide outsourcing into three major types. The first occurs
when a firm outsources entire business functions or processes. Thus, for
instance, biotechnology companies involved in research may outsource
functions such as pharmaceutical manufacturing or marketing and
distribution to firms with skills and expertise in those specialties. A second
type of outsourcing involves locating portions of business processes, or
components of complex products or services, outside the boundaries of the
firm. Within the human resource function, for instance, a company may
outsource the administration of benefits or payroll services while retaining
other functions inside the firm. Finally, firms may outsource the staffing
function, obtaining workers through intermediaries such as temporary
employment agencies, professional employer organizations, and executive
search firms.181 In these cases, the firm typically supervises and directs the
work of individuals who are provided by intermediaries.
2. Employee Tasks and Skills
One body of work to which Davis-Blake and Broschak direct attention is
research on the impact of outsourcing on permanent employee tasks and
skills. This body of work suggests that the impact depends on the types of
functions that a firm outsources and its reasons for doing so. Firms may
seek to outsource support functions while retaining core functions, or may
assign simpler tasks to contractors in order to reduce the organization’s
dependency on them. In these cases, permanent employees can be freed
from routine tasks and have greater opportunities to focus on more complex
and challenging work.182 In other cases, firms may outsource for
specialized skills and expertise that are too expensive, used too
infrequently, or change too rapidly to justify investment in internal
capabilities.
This decision may relegate permanent employees to
performance of relatively routine tasks.183
Outsourcing also may create the need for employees to perform new
tasks and learn new skills. Firms that engage in process outsourcing need
to develop structures to integrate the work of parties whom they do not
directly supervise. As the earlier discussion of process integration
indicates, employees must develop skills in project management. One
study of engineering outsourcing, for instance, identified five capabilities
180. Id.
181. Id. at 324–25.
182. Paul S. Adler, Making the HR Outsourcing Decision, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall
2003, at 53, 55–56; Soon Ang & Sandra A. Slaughter, Work Outcomes and Job Design for
Contract Versus Permanent Information Systems Professionals on Software Development
Teams, 25 MIS Q. 321, 323 (2001); Brenda A. Lautsch, Uncovering and Explaining
Variance in the Features and Outcomes of Contingent Work, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
23, 24 (2002).
183. See G. EDWARD GIBSON, JR., ALISON DAVIS-BLAKE, JOSEPH P. BROSCHAK &
FERNANDO J. RODRIGUEZ, OWNER/CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES: PHASE I
REPORT 32–33 (1998).
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that firm engineers need beyond technical skills: (1) writing and managing
contracts and budgets, (2) communication skills for coordinating and
cultivating relationships with outsource partners, (3) the ability to motivate
and engage in change management with outsource partners, (4) skills for
team-building and delegating responsibilities, and (5) problem-solving
skills for analyzing options and planning for contingencies.184 The firms in
which these engineers worked, however, did little to provide formal training
in these skills. This research suggests that some firms still fail to appreciate
that movement of tasks outside the firm to multiple providers requires
taking steps to integrate activities all along the supply chain.
Outsourcing that takes the form of staffing through intermediaries also
may create new tasks for firm employees, although these may be less
complex and more burdensome than those required by process outsourcing.
When firms use temporary workers, employees often are required to
supervise and correct their work.185 “[I]n many lead firms,” Davis-Blake
and Broschak report, “the responsibility for orientation, training, and
socialization of outsourced workers regularly falls on the shoulders of the
lead firm’s employees, who do not receive any additional compensation for
these efforts.”186 This can make it hard for employees to do their own jobs
adequately, especially when turnover of temporary workers is high.
3. Work Group Dynamics
Firms also need to be aware that outsourcing can produce changes in the
composition of work groups and in group processes that have the potential
to affect relationships among workers. Most research has focused on the
use of a “blended workforce,”187 which involves temporary or contract
workers brought into firms to work with permanent employees. Research
on the impact of outsourcing on permanent employee attitudes has focused
thus far only on staffing through intermediaries. This scholarship suggests
that firms need to be aware of certain challenges that this form of
outsourcing can pose. One study of an electronics manufacturing plant, for
instance, found that the use of temporary workers reduced perceived job
security and fostered resentment among permanent employees at having to
184. ALISON DAVIS-BLAKE, KEVIN E. DICKSON, JOSEPH P. BROSCHAK, G. EDWARD
GIBSON, JR., FERNANDO J. RODRIGUEZ & TODD A. GRAHAM, OWNER/CONTRACTOR
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES:
PHASE II REPORT 31–33 (1999) [hereinafter
OWNER/CONTRACTOR PHASE II REPORT].
185. See John Francis Geary, Employment Flexibility and Human Resource Management:
The Case of Three American Electronics Plants, 6 WORK EMP. & SOC’Y 251, 262–64 (1992);
Vicki Smith, Institutionalizing Flexibility in a Service Firm: Multiple Contingencies and
Hidden Hierarchies, 21 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 284, 298–300 (1994).
186. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 328.
187. Susan J. Ashford, Elizabeth George & Ruth Blatt, Old Assumptions, New Work: The
Opportunities and Challenges of Research on Nonstandard Employment, 2 ACAD. MGMT.
ANNALS 65 (2007); Alison Davis-Blake, Joseph P. Broschak & Elizabeth George, Happy
Together? How Using Nonstandard Workers Affects Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Among
Standard Employees, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 475 (2003).
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work with their temporary colleagues.188 Another study of aerospace
engineers found that the presence of contract engineers lowered employee
trust in the organization.189 Still other research has found that the use of
temporary workers lowered permanent employees’ commitment to the
organization, reduced their trust in it, and increased perceptions of a
violation of the psychological contract;190 that it lowered trust toward peers,
organization-based self-esteem, and altruism;191 and that it increased
employee turnover.192
Blake-Davis and Broschak note that there is no consensus on why staff
outsourcing may lead to negative permanent employee attitudes in some
cases.193 One possible explanation is that the use of temporary workers
puts subtle pressure on permanent employees to work harder and longer
than usual because temporary workers do not work overtime and generally
are not flexible in their assignments.194 Another is that the use of
outsourced labor serves as a subtle reminder to employees of their
potentially uncertain job status;195 still another is that employees resent the
uncompensated responsibilities for training and supervising temporary
workers that they need to assume.196
Research suggests that the effect of outsourcing on permanent employee
attitudes may differ according to the status of the outside worker, the
position of the employee, and the nature of the interaction between outside
and permanent workers. One early study found that the use of temporary
production workers to work alongside permanent employees in an
electronics manufacturing plant created tension and impaired group
performance because employees resented the fact that they had to take time
away from their own jobs to train and supervise temporary workers.197
Another study of a business services firm concluded that temporary workers
heightened work group conflict for the same reason and because hierarchies
tend to develop when individuals work together under different
arrangements.198 Consistent with the latter finding, Davis-Blake and
Broschak suggest that the negative effects of outsourcing increase with the
proportion of temporary workers in work groups because temporary
188. Geary, supra note 185, at 260–61.
189. Jone L. Pearce, Toward an Organizational Behavior of Contract Laborers: Their
Psychological Involvement and Effects on Employee Co-workers, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1082,
1090 (1993).
190. Elizabeth George, External Solutions and Internal Problems: The Effects of
Employment Externalization on Internal Workers’ Attitudes, 14 ORG. SCI. 386, 399 (2003).
191. Prithviraj Chattopadhyay & Elizabeth George, Examining the Effects of Work
Externalization Through the Lens of Social Identity Theory, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 781,
787 (2001).
192. Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 330.
193. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 330.
194. See Geary, supra note 185, at 260–61; Smith, supra note 185, at 300.
195. See Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 330; Geary, supra note 185, at 259.
196. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 478.
197. See Geary, supra note 185, at 259–60.
198. See Smith, supra note 185, at 300–01.
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workers tend to have lower social status in such groups than do employees,
a difference that is reinforced by employers’ efforts to identify and treat the
two sets of employees differently in order to avoid coemployment
claims.199
The effect of blending outside workers and employees may differ
depending on the characteristics of each. Davis-Blake, Broschak, and
Elizabeth George, for instance, distinguish between contract workers, who
sign agreements with organizations to furnish services for a specific length
of time, and temporary workers, who are hired for indefinite, typically
Contractors are more likely to work
shorter, periods of time.200
independently or to receive some supervision from an intermediary staffing
organization. The study indicates that using temporary workers in blended
work groups has a greater negative effect on group dynamics than using
contract workers, and that this effect increases with the proportion of
temporary workers. They suggest that contract workers pose less of a threat
to the job security of permanent employees because they typically are used
to provide new knowledge that is complementary to, rather than a substitute
for, the knowledge of employees.201 Contract workers also generally
require less supervision from permanent employees than do temporary
workers.
Research also suggests that workers in lower-wage positions are more
strongly affected by the use of blended work groups because they are most
similar to, and most threatened by, the use of temporary workers.202
Employees with formal responsibility for training coworkers are less
affected than other employees, perhaps because they are not asked
informally to take on additional duties without compensation.203
The tension that can result from blending temporary and permanent
employees can prompt closer management supervision in an effort to
integrate the two types of workers. This in turn may increase mistrust of
and resentment toward supervisors of permanent employees.204 Other
research finds that employees who work with either temporary or contract
workers report poorer relationships with supervisors,205 and that the
relationships worsen with higher proportions of temporary workers.206 Two
scholars suggest that permanent employees hold their supervisors

199. See Joseph P. Broschak & Alison Davis-Blake, Mixing Standard Work and
Nonstandard Deals: The Consequences of Heterogeneity in Employment Arrangements, 49
ACAD. MGMT. J. 371, 388–89 (2006).
200. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 476.
201. See id. at 477.
202. See Broschak & Davis-Blake, supra note 199, at 389; Davis-Blake et al., supra note
187, at 478.
203. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 476.
204. See Geary, supra note 185, at 259.
205. See Davis-Blake et al., supra note 187, at 476.
206. See Broschak & Davis-Blake, supra note 199, at 389.
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responsible for fairly allocating work in blended groups and thus may
blame them for perceived inequities in such groups.207
In sum, the use of contingent workers, particularly through staffing
outsourcing, can both increase organizational flexibility and pose
challenges in the workplace. On one hand, “[s]taffing outsourcing allows
many lead firm managers to delegate training, evaluating, or monitoring of
temporary workers to peers and to delegate responsibility for hiring,
managing, and disciplining temporary workers” to outside
intermediaries.208 On the other hand, if firms are not careful, this practice
has the potential to undermine both the effectiveness of work teams and the
relationships between supervisors and subordinates. Firms that plan to use
contingent workers need to consider the potential for such outcomes and
how to avoid them in order to derive meaningful benefits from outsourcing.
4. Organizational Design
Outsourcing requires that knowledge and information flow across the
organizational boundaries between a lead firm and its outside providers. As
two scholars observe,
[T]he problem of information flow across boundaries is not simply one of
determining how to transfer a particular volume and type of information.
Differences between lead firms and suppliers in culture, norms, and even
the language in which business is normally conducted can easily lead to
misperceptions and miscommunications about assumptions, standard
operating procedures, and even the definition of terms used by the other
party.209

Responding to this challenge may require changes in both organizational
structure and culture. The nature of these changes will depend upon the
complexity of the work that is outsourced, its volume, whether it is a core
or peripheral function of the firm, whether entire or partial processes are
outsourced, and whether design as well as execution of the activity is
delegated to an outside provider.210
Three researchers have suggested that firms can respond to the need to
enhance information flow across organizational boundaries in three basic
ways.211 First, they can use formal governance mechanisms to specify in
some detail the interaction between firms. One way to do this is by entering
into alliances governed by relational contracts with certain suppliers. These
alliances represent legal relationships around which firms can create
organizational structures. Such relationships are relatively stable; they
207. See id.
208. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 331–32.
209. Id. at 333.
210. See id. at 332–35.
211. Id. at 332–33. See generally Edward G. Anderson, Jr., Alison Davis-Blake &
Geoffrey G. Parker, Managing Outsourced Product Design: The Effectiveness of
Alternative Integration Mechanisms (Oct. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
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reduce the number of suppliers and allow a firm to focus on
communications with them.212 A variation on this is to divide suppliers
into different tiers and focus interactions on one tier, relying on suppliers in
this tier to manage the activities of providers in other tiers.213
If the costs of establishing and maintaining alliances or supplier tiers are
too high, a firm may attempt to maximize information flow by relying on
less formal mechanisms. One is colocation—assigning personnel from one
organization to work in another. Another is using “boundary spanners”
whose main responsibility is to enhance the exchange of information
between a lead firm and its suppliers.214 These measures can create
personal relationships that foster trust, align expectations, and enable the
transmission of tacit or sensitive information.215
Outsourcing may have an impact not only on organizational structure but
also on organizational culture. As Davis-Blake and Broschak observe,
“[b]ecause outsourcing changes which individuals interact regularly with
each other, the frequency of those interactions, and the issues about which
they interact, outsourcing has the potential to materially change
organizational culture.”216 Research on this subject currently is relatively
limited. One body of scholarship indicates that contract and temporary
workers are less likely than employees to identify with and be committed to
the lead firm.217 One study, however, focused on the extent to which
contract workers identify with both the lead firm and the intermediary.218 It
found that identification with the lead firm can be strengthened by social
ties between contract and permanent employees, while identification with
the intermediary tended to be a function of that organization’s
distinctiveness in the marketplace.219 Since individuals will shape and
disseminate an organization’s culture the more they identify with it,
promoting strong social ties between contract and permanent employees
may help develop a common culture. Exactly what the elements of that
common culture are likely to be, however, and the extent to which it
212. See Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated
Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85, 106–09 (1995).
213. See Kim B. Clark, Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts
Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development, 35 MGMT. SCI. 1247, 1252 n.14
(1989).
214. See Lori Rosenkopf & Atul Nerkar, Beyond Local Search: Boundary-Spanning,
Exploration, and Impact in the Optical Disk Industry, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 287, 290
(2001).
215. See Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The
Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 59 (1997).
216. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 334.
217. See, e.g., Judi McLean Parks, Deborah L. Kidder & Daniel G. Gallagher, Fitting
Square Pegs into Round Holes: Mapping the Domain of Contingent Work Arrangements
onto the Psychological Contract, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 697 (1998); Linn Van Dyne
& Soon Ang, Organizational Citizenship Behavior of Contingent Workers in Singapore, 41
ACAD. MGMT. J. 692 (1998).
218. See generally Elizabeth George & Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, One Foot in Each
Camp: The Dual Identification of Contract Workers, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 68 (2005).
219. Id. at 93–95.

2188

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

reinforces or undermines the lead firm’s objectives, remain a subject for
future research.
Research on outsourcing the human resources function also may have
implications for organizational culture.
Lead firms and staffing
intermediaries in many cases are moving away from spot market
transactions toward more complex interdependent relationships in which
the intermediary attempts to learn the nuances of the lead firm’s culture and
provide it with employees that are a good fit.220 Intermediaries whose
personnel work on the lead firm’s site may be especially likely to “become
involved with complex, often unstated negotiations with lead firm managers
about what the culture of the lead firm should be and about the attributes
required to fit in the culture of the lead firm.”221
Davis-Blake and Broschak conclude that future research should attempt
to clarify the impacts of outsourcing on organizational structure and culture.
They suggest that one potentially significant issue is whether firms that
begin to rely on outsourcing continue to do so or vacillate between
outsourcing and internal production in order to avoid some of the negative
impacts of relying on outside providers. For firms that follow the first path,
outsourcing may result in relatively permanent changes in organizational
features. For firms that pursue the second path, effects on structure and
culture may be more ephemeral.222
5. Law Firms
Assessing the potential impact of outsourcing on work relationships
involving law firm projects requires first considering what type of
arrangements law firms tend to use. Do most firms outsource entire
processes, partial processes, or the staffing function to obtain temporary
employees? We need much better data to answer this question with any
confidence, but we can suggest at least the broad outlines of what law firms
seem to do. Some firms use outside vendors to manage functions such as
litigation discovery or patent filing, which arguably constitutes locating
entire processes outside the firm. The boundary between entire and partial
processes is not airtight. Discovery, for instance, obviously is part of the
larger litigation function, and it needs to be integrated with other activities.
Nonetheless, it is a relatively discrete aspect of a case that can be segregated
to some extent. Firms also assign portions of larger tasks to legal process
outsourcers, such as the document review function of discovery, legal
research to inform the provision of a variety of legal services, and the due
diligence portion of transactional or regulatory work. In these instances of
entire or partial process outsourcing, much of the work seems to be done off
site and tends to be supervised most directly by the contractor.
220. See, e.g., VICKI SMITH & ESTHER B. NEUWIRTH, THE GOOD TEMP (2008); DavisBlake & Broschak, supra note 179.
221. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 179, at 335.
222. See id. at 336.
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While some firms do engage in outsourcing of entire or partial processes,
a large percentage of firms appear to use contract lawyers hired through
staffing intermediaries. These lawyers are on temporary assignment, but
may work as long as two or three years on a specific matter, particularly in
litigation. They tend to be supervised mostly by people within the firm,
rather than by outside parties. A good number probably do work, such as
document review, that at least some other firms delegate to legal process
outsourcing companies. Firms may prefer to use contract lawyers for such
tasks because of concern about the quality of LPO work, the desire to staff
sensitive matters so as to ensure supervision by members of the firm, or
simply because a firm has not evaluated the extent to which portions of its
work could be outsourced to LPOs.
Whatever the form that outsourcing takes, law firms appear
overwhelmingly to use it for what are regarded as routine support functions.
This tendency may free up lawyers within the firm to do more complex,
sophisticated work. Contract lawyers or LPO employees, for instance, may
conduct large-scale document review that a few years ago was performed
by associates. Thus, while there may be fewer associate positions in law
firms if outsourcing continues to gain momentum, those that remain may be
offered more challenging work.
Davis-Blake and Broschak’s review of research suggests that members of
law firms that engage in process outsourcing will need to develop skills to
coordinate the work of companies whose work the firm does not supervise
on a daily basis. They will need, for instance, good communications skills,
along with the ability to motivate workers from different organizations,
negotiate and administer service contracts, assemble effective teams, and
plan for and respond to contingencies. Davis-Blake and Broschak found in
one study that engineering firms generally did not provide much training in
such skills,223 and it is unlikely that law firms currently do either. Members
of firms for the most part probably are building these capabilities through
trial and error, but an increase in the use of process outsourcing will require
that law firms provide more systematic training in these functions.
In contrast to employees of process outsourcing companies, contract
lawyers tend to be directly supervised by law firms. This can create extra
burdens for law firm lawyers—often associates—who are responsible for
training, monitoring, and correcting the work of these temporary workers.
The need to oversee this routine work may reduce the time that lawyers are
able to devote to the more complex work that outsourcing theoretically
frees them up to perform. This may create some resentment of both
contract lawyers and the firm, especially if lawyers are not given credit for
assuming this supervisory responsibility. It is less clear whether the use of
contract lawyers is likely to generate negative attitudes because it heightens
lawyers’ sense of job insecurity. Contract lawyers may serve as a reminder
that some portion of the work done in law firms does not require complex
223. OWNER/CONTRACTOR PHASE II REPORT, supra note 184, at 32.
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analytical skills and that the percentage of such work may increase as even
sophisticated tasks are broken down into simpler discrete components that
involve following standard routines that require minimal discretion. This
reminder may be especially salient for associates.
Given the relatively small number of parties in the current law firm
supply chain, firms may not need to devise substantially different structures
to ensure adequate information flow between themselves and outside
suppliers. To the extent that the size of the chain and number of
participants increases, they may begin to follow their clients’ practice of
assembling preferred provider networks. This would not only enhance the
flow of information but also could help address the risk of a more
fragmented workforce comprised of people inside and outside the firm with
affiliations to different organizations. Law firms already face major
challenges in sustaining integrated cultures for a variety of reasons, and
greater reliance on a network of outside suppliers could exacerbate them.
More detailed empirical research on law firm use of contingent workers
would help in analyzing the issues that scholarship on other organizations
suggests arises with this type of employment relationship. It would be
helpful to know more about when law firms use contingent workers, for
what kinds of tasks, who supervises them, and how using them affects the
work that lawyers in the firm do.
CONCLUSION
The Rio Tinto contract with CPA Global suggests that law firms are
likely to face increasing pressure to disaggregate their services and engage
in at least some outsourcing to compete effectively in the legal services
market. Disaggregation will require greater attention to how work can be
decomposed, with the goal of selecting the optimal mix of personnel and
technology to provide service on various matters. This process may result
in an increase in the types of positions available for permanent salaried
lawyers in law firms who have specialized skills in discrete functions or
areas of law. It also may increase the use of workers outside the boundaries
of the firm. Much of the work that firms assign to both groups is likely to
be relatively routine or at least limited in scope.
As a result, the number of associate positions available in law firms each
year may decline from previous years as outside workers take on these
tasks. At the same time, the responsibilities that this smaller group of
associates assumes may be more challenging than they traditionally have
been. This raises two questions. First, to what extent does complex legal
work require familiarity with more routine tasks such as reviewing
documents for relevance or privilege, summarizing depositions, or
conducting searches on research databases? If sophisticated work requires
experience with routine tasks, how will associates acquire such experience
if clients will pay only for contract lawyers or LPOs to do routine work?
Second, will firms acknowledge that acquiring complex skills will
require some period of time in which associates generate only minimal

2010]

SUPPLY CHAINS AND POROUS BOUNDARIES

2191

revenues while they are being trained? This may mean that the type of
apprenticeship programs that some firms recently have announced may
become more common.224 Those programs will require a substantial
commitment by the firm to training and development and by its partners to
devote time to mentoring. Will such commitment be forthcoming? If firms
begin to hire smaller entering associate classes, it may be advisable to spend
more time screening candidates and investing in those who are selected,
rather than using only superficial hiring criteria and relying on competition
among lawyers who join the firm to identify those who have a future with
it. Will firms be willing to do this?
What legal career paths will be available in this emerging world? It may
be that a smaller number of law school graduates realistically will be able to
aspire to tenure-track associate positions that pay anything like the salaries
that beginning lawyers have enjoyed in recent years. Other graduates,
however, could have opportunities to join firms as permanent lawyers at a
comfortable but not exceptionally high salary, focusing on work that is
somewhat specialized and narrower than work available to tenure-track
associates. More modest average salaries may put pressure on law schools
to limit tuition increases, since the financial return on a law school
education may be smaller for many graduates than it has been in recent
years. Schools also will need to think carefully about what kinds of legal
and nonlegal capabilities their graduates will need if career opportunities
change in this way.
On a more general level, the continuing advance of disaggregation would
create even more ambiguity about what skills distinguish lawyers from
other occupations. Performance of an increasing number of activities in the
legal services supply chain by nonlawyers would begin to shrink the
territory that lawyers can claim as their own. If lawyers attempt to define
that territory as the ability to render sophisticated advice requiring complex
judgment about corporate affairs, other professionals are in a position to
claim that they possess the same set of skills.
The economic downturn therefore could mark a moment of transition for
law firms less because of its immediate financial impact and more because
it has highlighted and accelerated the trend toward the disaggregation of
legal services that had begun before it. This trend reflects the maturation of
the legal services sector into a highly competitive industry driven more
forcefully than ever by pressures for efficiency. How law firms, clients,
and organizations connected with this industry respond could shape not
only the future of law firms, but of the legal profession itself.

224. See Jeff Jeffrey, For Some Firms, An Extra Step for the Newest Recruits, NAT’L L.J.,
June 29, 2009, at 1.

